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1 This study addresses the broader theoretical debate over the rela
between structure and agency. While structural constraints usually block
actors from enabling collective action at sufficient breadth and intensity
sustainable power shifts, the question is whether and how action – from bo
and below — can ever push back those constraints. The analysis here is gro
the ‘‘state-society synergy” approach (e.g., Evans, 1996; Fox, 1992, 1996).
micro levels, this dilemma is often posed in terms of the limits and possib
official ‘‘invited spaces” for social actors to engage with the state. While
spaces,” convened from above, are often superficial, co-opted exercises that r
social exclusion, grassroots agency can also make autonomous deliberation
transforming them into ‘‘claimed spaces” (Cornwall, 2002; 2004; Cornwall
2006; Fox, 2007).Jonathan Fox
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Outliera b s t r a c t
Conventional international development project approaches to enable participation of the excluded often
fall short of building countervailing power, which is key for accountability. This study analyzes possible
exceptions to identify causal pathways, as well as long-term effects beyond projects. The methodology
combines the identification of positive outliers, process tracing and comparative analysis of five World
Bank projects from the 1990s that were also the focus of subsequent academic research. Tangible open-
ings from above that enabled countervailing power took two main forms: 1) institutionalized power-
sharing over allocation of social funds — at local, subnational and national levels and 2) support for
autonomous, multi-level social organizations, including collective titling of ethnic territories. Over the
longer term, projects lacked strong national allies and their most innovative contributions were reversed,
watered down or at best contained - though these differences mattered to social actors on the ground.
The most analytically significant finding is that projects can have not only contested and uneven out-
comes (‘‘mixed results”), but also contradictory interaction effects. This poses the methodological chal-
lenge of how to measure and explain the relative weights of both countervailing power shifts and elite
capture.









Analysts have long debated whether pro-participation initia-
tives by large development agencies can enable empowerment of
the disenfranchised. Numerous studies have found that top-
down, governmental or international aid attempts to induce partic-
ipation tend to result in elite diversion or capture. Both main-
stream and radical analysts concur that structural obstacles and
pre-existing power imbalances usually prevent official develop-
ment agencies’ ostensibly pro-participation initiatives from
enabling significant power shifts (e.g., Mansuri & Rao, 2013;
Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Stated project goals are transformed as
they pass through layers of aid bureaucracies, national government
agencies and local power brokers. Official reports document num-
bers of meetings rather than power shifts. Institutional ethnogra-
phies spell out how this works in nuanced detail (e.g., Mosse,
2005; Corbridge, Williams, Srinivastava, & Veron, 2005; Li, 2007).
While some critics contend that official participatory development
initiatives are always captured, others contend that exceptions are
possible and emphasize the importance of ‘‘multi-scaled citizen-
ship” to achieve more transformative goals (Hickey & Mohan,2004: 13). How can aid-backed governance reforms open up space
to bolster ‘‘slow-burning processes of democratization?”
(Corbridge et al., 2005: 258).
This study seeks to identify the causal pathways through which
international development projects can transcend dominant pat-
terns of elite capture and instead enable forms of countervailing
power.1 The point of departure draws on a concept borrowed from
the study of social movements. The idea of ‘‘political opportunities”
suggests that even partial openings from above can change the con-
text within which social actors assess whether and how to engage ineproduce
possible,
& Coelho
62 J. Fox /World Development 132 (2020) 104978collective action.2 When seen from below, divisions among elites can
constitute cracks in the system. For social actors, official develop-
ment agencies’ participation agendas — if implemented at scale —
are part of the political opportunity landscape.3 Yet critics point
out that the concept of ‘‘political opportunities” is often applied so
broadly that it is synonymous with the all-purpose ‘‘context mat-
ters‘‘ (Goodwin & Jasper, 2004). Analysts call for more consistent
operationalization of the concept to address: ‘‘what counts‘‘ as a rel-
evant political opportunity? This study is informed by sociologists’
recommendation to identify specific mechanisms that link context
to action by focusing on issue-specific openings that are directly rel-
evant or targeted to distinct social actors (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004:
1464).4
This study uses a ‘‘positive outlier” approach (also known as
‘‘positive deviance”) to identify possible exceptions to dominant
patterns. Here that refers to internationally-funded government
projects or programs that may have gone beyond conventional
superficial approaches to participation.5 Methodologists argue that
the goal of explaining surprising results is to provide a ‘‘generaliz-
able hypothesis about the phenomenon” (Gerring, 2017: 74-75). In
contrast, here the goals of focusing on outliers are to identify their
causal pathways, to make visible hidden methodological challenges,
and to encourage analysts to focus more explicitly on countervailing
power.
This study uses process tracing to explain the trajectories of five
outlier cases and concludes that they all shared two key character-
istics: 1) elements of projects supported tangible state actions that
enabled some degree of autonomous collective action, either
directly or indirectly, and 2) elite responses rolled back, watered
down or contained power shifts. Yet for social actors, the difference
between rollback vs. containment of their inherently limited coun-
tervailing power matters, since containment can allow them to
fight again another day.
This contested terrain raises unanswered methodological ques-
tions. A key finding here is that even the most promising-looking
projects can have simultaneous contradictory effects, yet such out-
comes are rendered invisible by the conventional impulse to draw
summary conclusions regarding whether innovative projects or
policies ‘‘worked.” This recognition challenges researchers to2 In spite of the central concern with empowerment throughout the field of
development studies, analysts rarely engage with the political sociology literature on
social movements. This study addresses ‘‘political opportunity” as a standalone
concept, not its more elaborate ‘‘political process theory” framework. As Tarrow
summarized the approach: ‘‘Triggered by the incentives created by political oppor-
tunities, combining conventional and challenging forms of action and building on
social networks and cultural frames is how movements overcome the obstacles to
collective action and sustain their interactions with opponents and with the state
(Tarrow 1994: 1). See Caren’s literature review Caren’s (2007) and Boudreau’s early
application to the global South (1996). Though building on political process theory,
the ‘‘polity” approach to analysing the politics of inclusion explains state-society
interaction more broadly (Houtzager & Moore, 2003). The focus here is on multiple
possible forms of collective action rather than exclusively on protest.
3 This emphasis on the nature of openings from above is consistent with Mansuri
and Rao (2013). They conclude that for ‘‘induced participation” to ‘‘work,” key
conditions include a strong central government oversight role, along with vigorous
transparency and accountability reforms - ‘‘sandwich strategies” that align pressure
from above and below (2013: 287–288, citing Fox, 1992). Such strategies are absent
from conventional, locally bounded, tactical, tool-led approaches to induced partic-
ipation (Fox, 2015).
4 Similarly, development analysts often describe changes in context in terms of
‘‘political space” – a concept almost as elusive as ‘‘political opportunity.” One
definition includes three elements: institutional channels, political discourses and the
social and political practices of the poor (Webster & Engberg-Pederson, 2002). More
recently, on ‘‘civic space,” see Hossain et al. (2018).
5 ‘‘Positive deviance” and ‘‘positive outlier” are synonyms, although in sociology
the concept of ‘‘deviance” has a controversial history. For influential applications to
development studies, Andrews (2015) and Pascale, Sternin, and Sternin (2010). For a
conceptual review, see Herington and van der Fliert (2018).develop methods that can identify and explain the both the drivers
and the relative weights of both blockages and power shifts.2. Where is countervailing power in the participatory
development agenda?
Diverse practitioners have long attempted to harness the clout
of large international development agencies to promote ‘‘participa-
tory development,” under various labels.6 Both advocates and ana-
lysts often recognize the risks of co-optation, reversal and elite
capture, as well as the possibility that what makes participation
work at micro levels tends to get significantly watered down in
the process of scaling up, even in the best-case scenario.7 Yet it is
precisely the allure of scale — the prospect of opening civic and
social space for large numbers of excluded people to have more
autonomous voice and influence in governance — that leads advo-
cates to keep trying. However, promoting participation ‘‘at scale”
can be understood in diverse ways. Large numbers of meetings cited
in program reports may not add up to any power shift.8 The most
common repertoire for official participatory development, including
what is currently called social accountability, is limited to controlled
consultations whose deliberations can be easily captured or ignored
by authorities – and they rarely address multiple forms of ‘‘invisible
power” that limit the exercise of voice.9 Whether such convenings
involve participatory rural appraisals, community interface meetings
with frontline service providers or national technical meetings with
capital city civil society organizations, they usually involve some
voice but no teeth (Fox, 2015).
Scholarly debates over participatory development rarely explic-
itly address a core dimension of accountability: countervailing
power. As Fung and Wright put it, countervailing power refers to
‘‘a variety of mechanisms that reduce, and perhaps even neutralize
the power advantages of ordinarily powerful actors” (‘Fung and
Wright, 2003: 260, emphasis added).10 Countervailing power
involves bargaining power – the leverage needed both to question
authority without reprisals – and to get those in power to listen.11
Countervailing power can be expressed in either adversarial orThere was a boom in research and debate on these issues during the period
addressed in this study, including, among others: Bebbington, Guggenheim, Oslon,
and Woolcock (2004), Gaventa (1998); Francis (2001), Bebbington, Woolcock,
Guggenheim, and Olson (2006), Blackburn and Holland (1998), Blackburn,
Chambers, and Gaventa (2002), Hickey and Mohan (2004, 2005), Joshi and Moore
(2000), Long (2001), Kumar and Corbridge (2002), Nelson and Wright (1995), World
Bank (2003a), among others. During that period, rights-based analysts focused
primarily on aid agency efforts at consultations and assessments (e.g., Blackburn &
Holland, 1998; Holland, Brocklesby, & Abugre, 2004; Webster & Engberg-Pederson,
2002). See also Hickey and Mitlin (2009) Gaventa (2006).
7 Hickey & Mohan conclude that participatory development efforts are most likely
to be successful when they meet three criteria, where: ‘‘they are pursued as part of a
wider radical political project; (ii) where they are aimed specifically at securing
citizenship rights and participation for marginal and subordinate groups; and (iii)
when they seek to engage with development as an underlying process of social
change rather than in the form of discrete technocratic interventions” (2005). The
study here is consistent with this expectation, with an empirical focus on cases where
official aid agencies were involved.
8 For a multi-level approach to scale for analysing state-society interaction for
governance reform, see Fox (2016) and Anderson, Fox & Gaventa (2020).
9 See, among others, Nelson and Wright (1995), VeneKlasen and Miller (2002),
McGee and Pettit (2019).
10 The concept’s original formulation addresses checks and balances between large
national institutions in society as well as the state (Agrawal and Ribot (1999),
Galbraith, 1952).
11 This concept underscores: 1) the relevance of tangible rights - defined as
‘‘enforceable claims” (Tilly et al., 1998), which go beyond seats at the table or
promises of entitlements - as well as 2) the capacity of the excluded to exercise
bargaining power with collective action at scale. In the discourse of power analysis,
this involves ‘‘power over” (see note 9). For social actors to exercise ‘‘power over,”
they need to have already addressed invisible and hidden power. Since power is often
understood in terms of capacities, countervailing power involves the capacity to limit
others’ capacity to abuse power.
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with some capacity to tangibly push back and constrain the abuse
of power. This study’s point of departure is that the specific empiri-
cal expressions of countervailing power will vary widely depending
on context.14 This assessment is based on the author’s participant-observation in four different
roles during the period under study. As an academic consultant to the Participatory
Development Learning Group, the author co-led third-party field-based monitoring of
the Mexico Decentralization and Regional Development project between 1992 and
1994, analysing a representative sample of Oaxacan municipalities (Fox & Aranda,
1996). In 1995–1996, as a visiting researcher embedded with the Bank Information
Center, an independent public interest group — and later serving on its board of
directors — the author was also involved in diverse related debates over participation
(cf, Bebbington et al., 2004). In addition, as a researcher in the Mexican public interest
group Trasparencia (1995–2005), the author was involved in independent project
monitoring and advocacy at multiple levels (Fox & Gershman, 2000; Fox, 2007). The
author also engaged in independent assessments of the World Bank’s transparency
and public accountability reforms during this period (Fox & Brown 1998; Clark, Fox, &
Treakle, 2005).
15 Peiffer and Armytage propose an innovative, mixed methods approach to identify
even less visible breakthroughs (Peiffer & Armytage (2019): 99).
16 This additional case selection criterion addresses a recent recognition that the
research evidence base on accountability innovations has been drawn primarily from
stable settings (Joshi, 2019).
17 Note that this study does not address the much broader comparative question of3. Research strategy and case selection criteria
The broad framing question here is: how can openings from
above enable autonomous collective action that bolsters counter-
vailing power for the excluded, even though such efforts usually
fail? This puzzle is addressed by asking: how can official aid agen-
cies contribute to enabling countervailing power that survives the
end of the project? Analysts distinguish between top-down initia-
tives that attempt to mobilize the poor directly, versus indirect
institutional changes that bolster the enabling environment for
collective action (Joshi & Moore, 2000), and this study will look
at both. The methodology combines positive outlier identification,
the comparative method and within-case process tracing to iden-
tify the mechanisms, causal pathways and long-term outcomes.
The conceptual point of departure is that large, unaccountable
institutions are often better understood as contested terrain than
as monolithic entities. This approach differs from the widely-held
assumption that powerful elite institutions are homogeneous
actors whose apparently disparate actions necessarily follow a sin-
gle, consistent logic. Examples of top-down institutional pillars of
the status quo that have been internally divided, partially and tem-
porarily influenced by pro-participation factions, include the
Catholic Church, with the rise and fall of the ‘‘preferential option
for the poor,” authoritarian, post-revolutionary one-party regimes
that include competing factions (e.g., Mexico from the 1930s
through the 1990s), corporatist unions (e.g., Brazil and Spain under
dictatorship) as well as the US government in the 1960s, with its
expansion of official community participation and anti-poverty
programs while simultaneously deploying security forces to attack
dissidents. In diverse times and places, competing agendas among
elites created spaces for autonomous organizing of the excluded,
which sometimes generated forms of countervailing power.
This study’s empirical focus is on an especially unlikely enabler
of induced participation — the World Bank.12 The first rationale for
that choice is methodological, to ground the comparison by holding
a single actor constant across varied national contexts.13 Indeed,
what is being held constant is a very distinctive subset of World Bank
projects, since the cases here are limited to projects that were per-
ceived at the time by diverse stakeholders to be pro-participation
outliers (see below). The second reason for this focus is analytical,
to address a ‘‘least likely” case. The proposition is that if such a tech-
nocratic institution can contribute to exceptions to the dominant
pattern, then the dynamic identified here may be possible in other
official development agencies. In contrast, if this study were to
address overtly pro-participation aid agencies, those findings would
say less about official development agencies more generally. A third
rationale for focusing on the World Bank is empirical, since it contin-
ues to play a significant global agenda-setting role in the field of12 The devastating social and environmental consequences of many World Bank
projects are widely-documented – the dynamics of its projects that directly attempt
to reduce poverty have received much less independent research attention.
13 For an alternative methodological approach that addresses a related comparative
question about international organizations and peace-building, Campbell compares
different agencies in the same national context, with a similar finding about the
significance of outliers: ‘‘[t]o create informal local accountability. . . country-office
staff must circumvent standard operating procedures. . . This circumvention is
necessary because country offices are designed to respond to the demands of their
headquarters and donors, not to those of local stakeholders” (Campbell, 2018: 4).participatory development – now rebranded as citizen engagement
and social accountability (see below).
The second criterion for case selection focuses on projects that
were widely seen by practitioners at the time as especially promis-
ing and innovative.14 This follows the ‘‘positive deviance” method of
relying on key informants to identify perceived pockets of progress
(Andrews, 2015).15 The third criterion focuses the analysis on even
more unlikely cases, selecting projects that were carried out in frag-
ile, violent or conflict/post-conflict settings (broadly defined).16 The
fourth criterion selects projects that were carried out between 15
and 20 years ago, providing a long-term perspective that allows
for an assessment of whether apparent progress was sustained over
time. A final, crucial selection criterion is that the study addresses
only cases that generated a diverse body of directly relevant empir-
ical academic research (reinforced by key informant interviews). The
study addresses five cases rather than a smaller number for two rea-
sons – to inductively search for multiple possible pathways and to
indicate that anomalies are not necessarily unique. To sum up, cases
selected share the following characteristics: the same agency, partic-
ipatory innovation (according to contemporary practitioner reports),
fragile/conflict settings, the same time period and an independent
evidence base.
In terms of enabling institutional factors, each World Bank pro-
ject was either designed in response to advocacy or was led by a
staffer who self-identified as pro-participation – based on previous
research that confirmed the relevance of these path-dependent
factors (Fox & Brown, 1998; Fox & Gershman, 2000). These pro-
jects’ participatory elements were different from the then-
growing portfolio of World Bank projects that contracted with
NGOs as apolitical service providers (e.g., Covey, 1998; Nelson &
Wright, 1995). The projects were all managed by staff who the
World Bank called ‘‘non-economist social scientists” – environ-
mental policy analysts, institutional development specialists or
anthropologists.17 Table 1 summarizes the key project
characteristics.why these projects were exceptions and not others, keeping the focus on how they
may have contributed to countervailing power. Nor does this study address the
interaction between these projects and the rest of the World Bank agenda in the same
country – though their expected legitimating effects probably account for why senior
managers would approve proposals from heterodox staff. Analysis of this broader
question would involve a different methodology, informed by the classic political
economy agenda that addresses the relationship between a state’s dual legitimation
and accumulation roles (e.g., O’Connor, 1973). For an example of such a contextual
political analysis of one of the five cases studied here, involving the World Bank in
Mexico during the period under study, see Fox (1997, 2000). The bank’s Mexico
portfolio shifted in the early 1990s from its 1980s emphasis on structural adjustment
to social and environmental projects, in order to bolster the ruling party’s social base
and to support NAFTA.
4 J. Fox /World Development 132 (2020) 1049784. Methodological considerations: outliers vs averages
The positive deviance approach addresses ‘‘outliers who suc-
ceed against the odds” (Green, 2016: 25). The rationale for trying
to explain anomalies is that they can reveal possible pathways of
change that would otherwise be hidden by dominant trends or ren-
dered invisible by averages.18 However, the goal of identifying
exceptions to dominant patterns of elite capture poses methodolog-
ical challenges. Mainstream innovations for measuring empower-
ment at scale are not new (e.g., Alsop, Bertelson, & Holland, 2006;
Narayan, 2005), but development agencies have few incentives to
deploy them.19 Independent scholars address these questions elo-
quently, often with deep, ethnographic perspective. Yet complemen-
tary methods are also needed to determine broader patterns
involving large-scale programs or policies that reach hundreds or
thousands of communities. As a result, both official and independent
evidence bases often have difficulty with addressing what is ‘‘themix
of the mixed results?” In other words, what are the relative weights of
different outcomes?20
The positive outlier approach is especially appropriate for analyz-
ing ambitious change initiatives whose goals are likely to be met at
best partially and unevenly – as in the case of efforts to overcome
extreme gender, racial, ethnic and class exclusion. Limited increases
in capacity and space for action may represent significant steps for-
ward for the excluded – while being difficult to assess externally in
any consistentway.At the same time, violent elites can be quite adept
at capturing and disguising themselves in the appearances and dis-
courses of grassroots development (e.g., Ballvé, 2013), which under-
scores the importance of ‘‘first do no harm” for external actors. This
underscores the methodological challenge of determining which is
which – elite capture vs limited yet still meaningful openings.
This ambiguity suggests the relevance of looking for outliers on
two levels – first, to identify exceptionally pro-participation open-
ings from above to begin with, and second, to look for exceptional
spaces that manage to resist elite diversion or capture within those18 The positive outlier approach is very different from the conventional evaluation
framing of the ‘‘what works” question, which implicitly privileges ‘‘yes or no” answers
(X does or does not ‘‘work”). For example, if an authoritarian government launched a
supposedly participatory program in a context where no freedom of association had
been previously tolerated, and the ostensible opening was captured by elites most of
the time, then conventional criteria would conclude that the program ‘‘doesn’t work.”
Indeed, a ‘‘first do no harm” approach would warn against a ‘‘net effect” of reinforcing
the authoritarian status quo. At the same time, if contestation within the same
program created unprecedented freedom of association in a substantial minority of a
program’s area of influence, then the same project ‘‘worked” for possibly millions of
disenfranchised people. This is precisely what happened in then-authoritarian Mexico
in the 1980s and early 1990s, when three waves of top-down rural development
reforms became contested terrain that allowed autonomous, multi-level peasant and
indigenous organizations to emerge, forming an archipelago of countervailing forces
of varying scope and density that survived for decades – amidst a sea of persistent
authoritarian rule (Fox, 1996, 2007).
19 This is one dimension of a broader internal incentive problem within the World
Bank, which discourages high quality monitoring in most of its projects. Its own
Independent Evaluation Group’s assessment of the quality of project level monitoring
and evaluation has found a consistent pattern of self-described inadequate quality,
both in a 1994 review and again more than twenty years later (World Bank, 1994b,
2016). The IEG’s 2016 review found that the quality of M&E was less than
‘‘substantial” in 70% of all projects that closed between 2006 and 2014 – in other
words, unreliable (World Bank, 2016: 37). IEG rated only a miniscule share of projects
as having high quality M&E. This indicates that the ‘‘knowledge bank” lacks robust
information on what actually happened in more than two-thirds of its projects.
20 This raises the issue of the methodological distinction noted in the literature on
case studies between extreme vs deviant cases. Extreme cases are close to ideal-types,
‘‘often regarded as prototypical or paradigmatic of a phenomenon” (Gerring, 2017:
68). Deviant cases, in contrast, diverge ‘‘from an expected causal pattern. . . thereby
registering a surprising result. . . (Gerring, 2017: 74–75). Because of the dominant
trends of elite capture or diversion noted earlier, even partial progress towards
building actual countervailing power is more likely to be anomalous rather than an
extreme along a continuum. This study’s focus on ‘‘least likely” cases does not address
‘‘ideal-types.”openings. This nested positive outlier agenda can help to identify
lessons that are relevant to current discussions about how to bol-
ster enabling environments for social and political action for
empowerment and accountability.5. From ‘‘participatory development to ‘‘citizen engagement at
the World Bank
The institutional context for pro-participation projects involves
two internal countervailing forces: 1) ostensibly mandatory social-
environmental policies created in response to external pressure
and 2) internal staff advocacy. First, to avoid or reduce projects’
social and environmental costs, the World Bank’s ‘‘safeguard poli-
cies” mandate elements of open government and social participa-
tion.21 These policies were created in direct response to
international protest campaigns against high profile ‘‘problem pro-
jects” in the late 1980s and early 1990s. What advocacy campaigners
at the time called the ‘‘case study approach” revealed costly system
failures. Though subsequent implementation of safeguard policies in
practice was notably uneven and incomplete (e.g., Rich, 2013; World
Bank, 2010), they nevertheless created a set of institutional hand-
holds that allowed subsequent advocacy campaigns to question,
change and sometimes even block socially and environmentally
damaging projects.22 This is a case of a broader issue addressed by
scholars who specialize in the study of international organizations
– the systemic distance between their discourse and their practice,
known as the ‘‘hypocrisy trap” (Weaver, 2008).
During the 1990s, while the new safeguard polices ostensibly
raised the ‘‘floor” with minimum socioenvironmental standards,
a small number of World Bank projects also attempted to raise
the ‘‘ceiling” by creating space for public participation. Here its
staff Participatory Development Learning Group contributed to
agenda-setting (1990–1994).23 Though these advocates lost many
internal policy debates, such as the technocratic capture of the social
capital agenda, they managed to influence some projects (e.g.,
Bebbington et al., 2006).
This study’s focus on outliers is also informed by an earlier
scholarly analysis of whether and how World Bank projects put
the pro-participation elements of the ostensibly mandatory
social-environmental safeguard policies into practice (Fox &
Gershman, 2000). Substantive openings were rare and partial. Of
the ten projects studied, only one complied consistently with safe-21 For its recently-revised Environmental and Social Framework, including a new
commitment to ‘‘stakeholder engagement,” see: https://www.worldbank.org/en/
projects-operations/environmental-and-social-framework.
22 Notably, the local/global advocacy campaign against mass evictions by India’s
Narmada dam led to an official World Bank exposé of its management misrepresen-
tation. This empowered campaigners and governmental allies to pressure its board to
concede previously unimaginable public information access and accountability
reforms (Fox & Brown, 1998, Udall, 1998). This external pressure also bolstered
insider reformers who then waged a bureaucratic ‘‘war of position” to push
conventional staff to come closer to complying with the safeguard policies – a
process most evident in the intense internal struggle over the official resettlement
policy (Fox, 1998). One key element of the package of safeguard policy reforms
included the creation of a precedent-setting, public-facing Inspection Panel, a semi-
autonomous investigative body with the capacity to respond to requests from
affected people to document and spotlight the World Bank’s violations of its own
policies (Clark et al., 2003).
23 To address skepticism from other staff, this internal mutual support group
generated evidence to show that participation could produce tangible development
benefits (e.g., Narayan, 1995). Following the Bank’s 1994 board approval of a pro-
participation strategy paper, insider advocates of participation clustered in the
regional and central Environmental and Social Development units (Aycrigg, 1998;
Bebbington et al., 2004, 2006; Miller-Adams 1999; World Bank, 1994a). The ‘‘pre-
history” of this approach is identifiable in at least two outlier projects in the late
1970s and early 1980s, including integrated rural development in Mexico (Cernea
1983, 1992) and urban sanitation planning in Brazilian cities (Ostrom, 1996; Watson,
1992) – both then under authoritarian regimes that included pockets of more open
development planners.
Table 1
World Bank project cases (1991–2002).
J. Fox /World Development 132 (2020) 104978 5guard policies, creating an enabling environment for autonomous
grassroots membership organizations. Seven others did not even
address relevant policies. Progress was possible where three fac-
tors converged: 1) internal World Bank staff champions, willing
to invest their own political capital, managed to control project
design and substantially implement safeguard polices involving
environmental assessment, indigenous peoples and public access
to information – 2) project design targeted pro-reform government
agencies and 3) projects focused on regions where social con-
stituencies already had some degree of representation and voice
(Fox & Gershman, 2000).
TheWorld Bank’s evaluation department carried out an internal
process review that focused on this 1990s wave of projects that
were considered to include participatory elements, based on a ran-
dom sample of investment projects (World Bank, 2001a).24 The
study found that while those reporting ‘‘using participatory
approaches rose from 40 percent of new projects approved in 1994
to 70 percent in 1998. . . (m)uch of the participation was quite lim-
ited, to only small parts of projects, too rushed or superficial, or
has been too ineffective to make much difference” (World Bank,
2001a: vi.). Long-term impact on institutions was considered unli-
kely because ‘‘participation usually involved an enclave within the
community, project, or government—partly because Bank-assisted
projects often bypassed existing processes or organizations”
(World Bank, 2001a: vi–vii). In addition, the evaluation considered
participation to be ‘‘undermined” because it was often limited to tai-
loring small subprojects to local conditions; indeed ‘‘(t)he absence of
participation in project identification and evaluation greatly reduces
the accountability of the Bank and implementing agencies to pri-
mary stakeholders” (World Bank, 2001a: 10).
Fast forward almost two decades and the World Bank’s current
Citizen Engagement Framework committed to build ‘‘beneficiary
feedback” mechanisms into all new investment projects (World
Bank, 2014b). Both internal and external observers expected that
this official commitment would be watered down, turned into a
‘‘tick-the-box” exercise, dominated by belated, pro forma customer24 This review was approved at the highest level, yet the evaluation department did
not publish it.satisfaction surveys, controlled consultation meetings that do not
permit informed decisions, feedback loops that never close and
grievance redress mechanisms that fail to redress grievances.
These are likely outcomes, insofar as the World Bank’s clients are
governments and internal staff incentives still prioritize the infa-
mous ‘‘pressure to lend” over the quality and impact of invest-
ments, according to its own evaluations (Portfolio Management
Task Force, 1992; World Bank, 2014a). A recent official evaluation
of the ‘‘Citizen Engagement” framework found both ambitious
combinations of multiple pro-participation commitments that it
described as ‘‘thick”— and minimalist ‘‘thin” approaches (World
Bank, 2018). An independent academic review concurred, finding
a substantial fraction of recent World Bank-funded projects that
commit, at least at the design stage, to multiple measures to create
space for citizen action (Nadelman, Le, & Sah, 2019). This persistent
pattern of mixed results underscores the relevance of distinguish-
ing between superficial openings for participation versus tangible,
targeted actions with the potential to enable countervailing power
– which will be the main focus of the evidence review that follows.
6. Case analysis
Process tracing (Bennett & Checkel, 2015) is applied below to
each case in the following ways: 1) the enabling factors are identi-
fied – in the national, World Bank and relevant territorial contexts;
2) the project’s mechanisms for both enabling and blocking coun-
tervailing power are identified; 3) the actors and processes
involved in building some form of countervailing power are anal-
ysed, including elite backlash; 4) countervailing power outcomes
over the long term are identified.
6.1. Mexico: Decentralization and Regional Development [DRD]
(1991–1995)
At the time, in most rural areas Mexico’s authoritarian regime
relied on local boss rule, which did not tolerate freedom of associ-
ation. Yet after the 1988 electoral fraud, the incoming government
attempted to restore legitimacy with the National Solidarity Pro-
gram, which funded ostensibly participatory social funds and
28 See extensive details in Burguete Cal y Mayor & Leyva Solano (2007) and Burguete
Cal y Mayor (2012).
29 Legally, a formal enabling environment for submunicipal community voice
existed in about half of Mexico’s states because they mandated self-governance for
community authorities, but this was not backed up with pro-poor municipal funding
allocation rules (Fox 2007: 208-210). Plus, rules for community representation on
municipal councils were widely ignored in practice.
30 Hernández-Díaz & Martínez found that in Oaxaca central municipal control was
‘‘changing, and villages (agencias) increasingly demand that the municipal center
treat them differently” (2007: 180). They found that official complaints by villagers to
the state congress against municipal centers for discrimination in resource allocation
increased from 50 in the first half of 2002 to more than 200 in 2003. See also Fox
(2007: 185) and Frente Indígena de Organizaciones Binacionales/Comunica (2014) for
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(Cornelius, Craig & Fox, 1994). In this context, Mexico’s Decentral-
ization and Regional Development project supported state and
local governments to fund small-scale, anti-poverty infrastructure
investments in four very low-income states, as part of a broader
shift in World Bank lending to Mexico from structural adjustment
to social and environmental investments (Fox & Aranda, 1996; Fox,
2000). These municipal social funds were the first large-scale
source of funding available to rural municipalities, responding to
longstanding unmet demands for self-governance in a historically
very centralized system.25
Mexican Social Development Ministry policymakers, supported
by World Bank project staff, used the federal government’s discre-
tionary administrative power to make a national policy change
that created an enabling environment for previously excluded out-
lying villages. In 1992, new national rules governing the distribu-
tion of rural municipal funds capped the fraction allowed to be
spent in town centers.26 This was the first time in Mexico that out-
lying villages had an entitlement to government funding for public
goods, which created an incentive for them to engage in collective
action and broader public oversight of municipal authorities. In
much of rural Mexico, these sub-municipal communities were the
primary expression of even partially autonomous indigenous territo-
rial self-governance (Fox, 2007).
The state of Oaxaca offered a best-case scenario for these partic-
ipatory municipal social funds because they engaged with its sur-
viving legacy of autonomous village self-governance based on
indigenous customary law. According to a state-wide study of a
representative sample of rural municipalities, participatory com-
munity bodies made the key project decisions in 58 percent of
the municipalities — a relatively high rate for Mexican social pro-
grams at that time. State officials induced project decisions in the
rest (Fox & Aranda, 1996). Following the 1994 Zapatista rebellion
in the neighbouring state of Chiapas, Oaxaca legally recognized
indigenous municipal governance systems. Subsequent research
showed that Oaxacan municipalities governed by customary law
(usos y costumbres) performed better in terms of local public goods
provision than did conventionally-governed municipalities, sus-
tained highly deliberative processes of citizen engagement and
most did not fall into the hands of local bossism (Díaz Cayeros,
Magaloni & Ruiz Euler, 2014).27
The same municipal funds program had very different out-
comes in states with different pre-existing local governance
regimes. In the three other states funded under the same project
— Chiapas, Guerrero and Hidalgo – most rural mayors represented
local elites who were accustomed to using violence and clientelism
to impose class and racial domination. Then the Zapatista rebellion
erupted in Chiapas in 1994, bringing the Mexico’s systemic oppres-
sion of indigenous peoples to global attention. Widespread percep-
tions of municipal authority as symbols of boss rule in Chiapas
were revealed when indigenous dissidents took sledgehammers
to the ‘‘municipal palaces,” creating images reminiscent of the col-
lective dismantling of the Berlin Wall just five years earlier. In the25 In practice, the political character of the Solidarity program varied across both its
subprograms and regions, ranging from top-down clientelism to more pluralistic and
inclusionary relationships with autonomous social organizations (Fox, 1994). The
municipal funds component was no exception.
26 The first official reference to this pro-poor targeting measure is in a Planning and
Budget Ministry report prepared as part of the World Bank project (Secretaría de
Programación y Presupuesto, 1992). Though the project covered only four states, the
targeting measure was applied to the program nationally. See details in the
government’s program handbook (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, 1992: 19).
27 See also Hernández-Díaz & Martínez (2007) and Velásquez (2000). Access to the
standing needed to participate in community assemblies is male-dominated,
however, with limited female access to voice, vote and the right to be elected
(Velásquez, 2004; Eisenstadt, 2011).aftermath of the rebellion, the government used the federal munic-
ipal funds (and redistricting) as counterinsurgency measures, in
order to divide communities and weaken the Zapatistas’ social
base.28 Because of these differences in pre-existing governance sys-
tems, the national municipal social funds program that created
unprecedented civic and social entitlements for Oaxacan indigenous
communities also bolstered authoritarian boss rule in other states.
The World Bank project’s potential contribution to countervail-
ing power was not its support for municipal social funds per se –
that was a pre-existing national program. Its main innovation
was to encourage the provisions that mandated pro-village target-
ing, weakening the municipal center’s monopoly control of public
funds. Yet this reform turned out to be temporary. In 1998, as part
of Mexico’s gradual transition to multi-party rule, a national
decentralization law bolstered municipal autonomy – and in the
process removed the centrally-imposed limits on town centers’
claims to federal funds.29 The promise of entitlements to official
social funds lived on, however, informing numerous long-term vil-
lage advocacy campaigns to gain standing and resources vis-à-vis
traditionally centralized municipal authorities.30 Yet even in Oaxaca,
both scholars and municipal governance advocates agree that most
central municipal authorities continue to control allocation of social
funds to outlying hamlets.31
The political opportunity for bolstering countervailing power in
this case involved funding for rural municipalities to follow ostensi-
bly participatory processes to support demand-driven community
development investments, including a brief window of opportunity
that established entitlements to outlying villages tomake claims on
those municipal funds. However, the long-term legacy of this early
1990s policy shift to enable voice of excluded communities is very
limited. Throughout rural Mexico, widespread, persistent claims
by outlying villages to municipal authorities for recognition and
funding persist, but still lack the consolidated countervailing power
needed to exercise enforceable rights.6.2. Brazil – Rondônia Natural Resource Management Project
[Planafloro] (1992–2002)
In the context of the high-profile 1980s debate over the World
Bank’s contribution to tropical deforestation by paving roads thatpractitioner accounts in the Mixteca region – where a municipal democracy
campaigner reports that mayors continue to allocate social investment funds at their
discretion (Bernardo Ramírez Bautista, Binational Front of Indigenous Organizations,
personal communication, Dec. 3, 2019). In Guerrero, a long-term advocate of
municipal governance reform finds that while village committees make persistent
claims, municipal resource allocation continues to be discretionary and electorally-
driven (Carlos García Jimenez, People’s Union, personal communication, Dec. 5, 2019).
31 For example, Eisenstadt cites the state’s former election director’s report that
villages had little say in municipal fund allocation (2011: 124). Martínez found that
Oaxacan municipal authorities’ responses to entitlement claims from outlying villages
were ad hoc and politicized rather than consistent or rule-based, which suggests a
lack of countervailing power (Martínez, 2013). Moreover, in the absence of proactive
anti-corruption measures - according to one longtime participant-observer of
Oaxacan rural municipal governance: ‘‘the decentralization of resources to the
municipalities has also contributed to decentralizing practices of corruption and
strengthening local elites” (Fernando Melo, email communication, June 28, 2019).
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advocacy organizations used their ‘‘boomerang” leverage to per-
suade the World Bank to fund a Brazilian government project that
created space for social participation (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The
Rondônia Natural Resource Management Project (Planafloro)
funded integrated rural development and technical approaches to
ecological zoning and environmental conservation in Brazil’s west-
ern Amazon, in response to a predecessor World Bank project that
became widely seen as an emblematic ‘development disaster’
(Keck, 1998; Feeney, 1998; Redwood, 2002; Rodrigues, 2004). Yet
the political context in Rondônia was institutionally fragile, violent
– and because many residents were recent migrants from other
Brazilian states -- lacking in the social networks that are widely
associated with autonomous capacity for self-representation and
collective voice. In contrast to the pioneering, more well-known
rubber-tappers movement of the neighboring state of Acre, they
were less organized in Rondônia.
Planafloro focused on land-use zoning and included agricultural
extension, territorial demarcation, rural credit, education, creation
of protected areas, institution building – and some road building –
with the stated goal of benefiting small-scale farmers, rubber tap-
pers and indigenous peoples (Garrison & Aparicio, n.d.). Yet the
state government limited the project’s participatory council to
‘‘window-dressing” (Keck, 1998: 204). Moreover, the World Bank
moved the project forward in spite of government noncompliance
with its environmental preconditions (Rodrigues, 2004: 54). Not
long after the project launched, in 1994, the failure of stakeholder
participation mechanisms led a local civil society coalition to cam-
paign for the World Bank to suspend disbursements, with interna-
tional advocacy support. Critics filed one of the first formal
complaints to the World Bank’s new public grievance redress
mechanism, the Inspection Panel (Garrison & Aparicio, n.d.; Keck,
1998; Millikan, 2001; Rodrigues, 2004). The claim led the World
Bank to bolster support for demarcation of indigenous and
rubber-tapper territories and mandated a mid-term review that
restructured the project to include more participation — though
its board did not authorize a formal investigation (Rodrigues,
2004: 75). Advocates criticised the belated reforms for not ade-
quately addressing the capacity of the state’s elites to block and
capture project goals (Feeney, 1998).32
The project restructuring in response to the Inspection Panel
claim included an unprecedented fund for social and civil society
organizations in the state, with some power-sharing over resource
allocation (Garrison & Aparicio, n.d.; Rodrigues, 2004). A review of
this fund found that ‘‘although the economic development impacts
are mixed, approximately 50% of the projects delivered tangible
benefits to local communities” (Browder, 2002; Browder et al
2008). The reform package also expanded protected areas that
were directly managed by social organizations (small farmers, rub-
ber tappers, indigenous peoples), as well as environmental conser-
vation areas and parks that were to be co-managed by civil society
organizations (Alves et al., 2008). Incipient local organizations
turned to the program to address needs that existing government
agencies should have met, and they were ‘‘stretched. . . too thin”
by the government’s extensive bureaucratic requirements and ‘‘un-
able to confront the backlash that the Rondonian conservative
forces . . . unleashed since 1998 against many of the gains of the
Planafloro” (Rodrigues, 2004: 85, 88). Indeed, the governor illegally32 The official World Bank evaluation later concurred: ‘‘The conservation agenda
was pushed strongly by the Bank but was resisted by state interests which were
primarily concerned with development activities. There were no clear targets for the
zoning of land use and no commitment to enforcement. The substantial pressures for
land clearing were underestimated. . . The mid-term review failed to address the
principal shortcomings of the project, grafting on a community-driven development
component (in deference to NGO pressure) without adequately engaging the private
sector and state and local government” (World Bank, 2004a).diverted program funds for electoral purposes with impunity, par-
alyzing operations for an entire year in 1999 (Rodrigues, 2004: 86).
Yet most of the funded organizations were politically progres-
sive, focused on bolstering grassroots associational life – for exam-
ple, building meeting halls in remote communities (Brown, Brown,
& Deposato, 2007, 2008). This concentrated wave of funding had
measurable political effects, significantly bolstering the Workers’
Party vote between the 1994 and 1998 presidential elections –
though starting from a low base-line in a conservative state
(Brown, Brown, & Deposato, 2002, 2007). Yet, unexpectedly, the
funding also bolstered electoral support for the political machine
associated with economic elites in the more closely contested
gubernatorial elections. It turns out that ‘‘while the governor did
not control who received the money, he could control when it
was released. As projects were completed and funds released, the
governor made appearances to claim credit for delivering funds
to communities” (Brown et al., 2007).
A decade after Planafloro, its contribution to collective titling
still survived, with indigenous territories accounting for 21% of
the state’s land, and another 7% in rubber-tapper extractive
reserves (Alves et al., 2008: 9). Yet their actual control of their land
was precarious, lacked external support and subject to land inva-
sions, repression and bribery of leaders (Alves et al., 2008). Accord-
ing to the World Bank’s own evaluation: ‘‘protection of
conservation areas and indigenous lands is hampered by weak or
absentmanagement and enforcement procedures. . .Organizational
arrangements for protecting boundaries are inefficient and unsus-
tainable. There is little control of deforestation because licensing
and enforcement procedures have not been implemented and land
tenure is disputed in many areas" (World Bank, 2004b). Indeed, the
state government actively tried to shrink and undermine protected
areas, while the federal government – including under theWorker’s
Party federal government — did little to strengthen them. Both
levels of government failed to uphold the rule of law. The Amazon
Working Group concluded that the underlying driver of the devas-
tation of protected areas in Rondônia was ‘‘a crisis of governance. . .
characterized by the subordination of public institutions and the
Rule of Law to the private interests of economic and political groups
involved in the illegal appropriation of the public patrimony (inva-
sion of public lands, logging theft)” (Alves et al., 2008: 56). As Keck
concluded, ‘‘Planafloro is a compelling example of the limits of out-
side leverage: the limits of the World Bank’s ability to get govern-
ments to do things they were not prepared to do anyway and the
limits of the NGO community’s ability to support local partners
who have not established a strong local base. . .” (1998: 205).
The political opportunity for countervailing power in this case
involved a power-sharing body that directed funding to rural grass-
roots organizations, as well as official titling and demarcation of
extensive indigenous and rubber-tapper collective territories. On
balance, however, the available evidence suggests that project
efforts to bolster countervailing power were offset by contradictory
political effects and did not survive beyond the end of the project.
6.3. Colombia Natural Resources Management Program [NRMP]
(1994–2001)
Colombia’s 1991Constitutionconstitutedapolitical opening that
inspired a wave of effervescent optimism, both within civil society
and the state, about the prospects for deepening democracy and
peace with justice – and it included bold new commitments to
indigenous andAfrodescendant rights. ItsArticle55 led theCongress
to pass Law 70 in 1993, granting black communities territorial land
rights in the Pacific coast region, a biodiversity hotspot. This new
political opening encouraged an unprecedented wave of Afrode-
scendant grassroots organizing and advocacy campaigning, includ-
ing calls for the right to territory and the formation of the ethno-
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advocacy debates that informed Law70 addressed trade-offs involved
in the associated ‘‘ethnicization of blackness” (Paschel, 2010: 739;
2016: 197–198).34 This was the Colombian government’s first tangi-
ble recognition of black rights since the abolition of slavery.35
Law 70 was followed by a 1995 decree that government agen-
cies should demarcate collective lands to Afrodescendant commu-
nity councils, which were required to solicit and manage the land.
Between 1996 and mid-2003, the Colombian government demar-
cated five million hectares, titling 122 black territories to councils
that represented 270,000 people, which was one of ‘‘the most
ambitious and radical territorial re-orderings ever attempted in
Latin America” (Offen, 2003: 44).36 Plans for large-scale infrastruc-
ture investments for extractives and trade in the region were put off
(Cárdenas, 2012; Escobar, 2008). Community-based advocacy orga-
nizations like the Process of Black Communities, as well as technical
advisors from universities and reformist government staff, docu-
mented the ethnohistorical land claims needed to formalize titling,
which reached half the region’s land (Grueso, Rosero, & Escobar,
1998; Agnew & Oslender, 2013). Yet shortly after the titling began
to take off, the nation’s civil war intruded into the region. Collusion
between government security forces and paramilitaries displaced
thousands of recently titled community land-holders.37 Neverthe-
less, the indigenous districts (resguardos) and black community
councils survived. Consolidated second-level organizations now
manage vast territories and work together in an inter-ethnic coali-
tion in the department of Chocó. Community land titles bolstered
bargaining power and self-governance while promoting environ-
mental sustainability (Ng’weno, 2000: 5; Vélez, 2011: 19).38
This World Bank project was part of a small cluster of outliers
that actively supported collective titling of black and indigenous
territories in Latin America during this period (e.g., Davis, Uquillas
& Eltz, 2004; Hale, 2011). The 1992 Yanaconas region-wide consul-
tation between black movement leaders and World Bank staff was
pivotal, leading the National Planning Department (a key govern-
ment agency) to support what became Law 70 (Ng’weno, 2000:33 On this mobilization of Colombian Afrodescendant civil society in the 1990s, see
Asher (2009); Grueso, Rosero, and Escobar (1998); Oslender (2016); Hoffmann
(2000); Paschel (2010); Pardo (2002); Restrepo (2002) and Wade (2012), among
others. This social and civic process did not have electoral spillover effects, as political
representation in Afrodescendant territories continued to be dominated by clien-
telistic machines (Agudelo 2002).
34 According to Wade, Law 70 ‘‘indigenized, regionalized and ruralized the question
of blackness in Colombia” (2012: 141). Pardo argues that government support for
organizing rural black community land councils for titling led them to focus more on
their own consolidation than on continued collaboration with urban organizations.
The land councils ‘‘realized that they don’t need intermediaries to dialogue with and
access the resources of the state” (2002: 74). This finding could be interpreted as
contributing to self-determination.
35 As Charo Mina-Rojas of the Process of Black Communities put it: ‘‘The process of
formulating Law 70 and collective titling created the opportunity to document and
‘systematize,’ within the framework of the law and with academic and intellectual
foundations, the communities’ existing practices of buen vivir, as a counterproposal to
capitalist development – including ideas about collective property, territoriality (in
contrast to ideas about land as a commodity to exploit) and the complex relationship
between people, nature and territory in this mega-biodiversity region.” (email
communication, July 7, 2019)
36 This was more of a land restitution program than land redistribution, insofar as
the government had legally dispossessed these ancestral community territories in
1959 by unilaterally declaring them ‘‘vacant lands.”
37 See Grajales (2015); IDMC (2007) and Oslender (2007). The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights later found the Colombian government responsible (Inter-American
Court of Human Rights 2013).
38 For a nuanced analysis of the limits and contradictions of the collective titles in
the face of agribusiness efforts at dispossession, see Cárdenas (2012). She finds: ‘‘The
changes in land tenure brought about by Law 70 created new multicultural subjects –
black communities – and new spaces of agricultural production – collective
territories. . . But this visibility has a dark side, too. Law 70 has also made it possible
for those same agents of the state and international capital to identify, negotiate with
and coopt the new political actors” (2012: 320).13, 53). In 1993,World Bank staff conditioned loan approval on reg-
ularizing ethnic land rights – citing both their own recently-
approved Forestry Policy and the Colombian congress’ passage of
the law to support ‘‘intensification” of the project’s funding for col-
lective ethnic titling.39 The NRMP project then funded consultations
leading up to the important procedural Decree 1745 in 1995 (Offen,
2003: 45), as well as all of the actual processing of the collective eth-
nic titles for Afro-Colombians and 17% of indigenous titles in the
region (Ng’weno, 2000: 7). The project also supported Regional Com-
mittees with community representation, to do monitoring and over-
sight of project implementation (World Bank, 2001: 13).
This external support was significant because the Colombian
state was slow to create institutions with the commitment and
capacity needed to carry out large-scale ethnic titling of ethnic ter-
ritories. Meanwhile, inter-ethnic conflicts over title boundaries
emerged because project design and the legal framework did not
include measures that recognized the cultural legacy of shared ter-
ritories. The unresponsiveness of the national land reform agency,
INCORA, contributed to tensions between indigenous and black
communities. A combination of pressure from communities,
interethnic disputes and World Bank social specialists eventually
obliged INCORA to create a dedicated unit and to begin to hire
Afro-Colombian staff (Ng’weno, 2007: 212). Indigenous and black
community advocacy to address INCORA bottlenecks led sympa-
thetic World Bank staff to encourage the Colombian government
to remove key regional directors for ‘‘inefficiencies and irregulari-
ties” (Ng’weno, 2000: 28). The World Bank later restructured the
project, in an effort to address inter-ethnic tensions (Sánchez
Gutiérrez & Roldán Ortega, 2002; Ng’weno, 2000: 64). Collective
ethnic titling in the Pacific region eventually peaked between
2000 and 2002, followed by national political changes that blocked
further progress.40 To an unusual degree, the NRMP project sided
with advocates of Afrodescendant and indigenous collective titling.41
In this case, the political opportunity for countervailing power
involved external funding and political support to bolster insider–
outsider coalitions that created community councils and titled eth-
nic territories on a large scale, carried out during a brief window
of opportunity by a state usually not known for effective implemen-
tation of land reform. These ethnic territories continue to be man-
aged by broad-based, scaled-up social organizations that constitute
building blocks of countervailing power. Community councils still
face mining and agribusiness interests, violent repression with
impunity and electoral clientelism.4239 Internal World Bank project appraisal memos from Ewald Goetz ‘‘Colombia –
Proposed Natural Resources Management Program – Consensus Building on Forest
Policy,” April 14, 1993 and Nicholas Kraft, Division Chief for Agriculture in Latin
America, August 19, 1993 (accessed via World Bank Archival requests).
40 Of the land titles officially listed in 2015, 96% had been finalized before 2006
(República de Colombia, 2015). The government also declined to bolster the Law 70
with comprehensive implementing legislation. More recently, new initiatives in
Afrodescendant territories outside the Pacific region are advocating for a revival of
collective land titling (e.g., Guerrero Lovera et al., 2017).
41 While the internal influence of pro-‘‘ethno-development” World Bank insiders
peaked during this period, bolstered by environmental protection arguments, at the
same time other World Bank staff pursued efforts to develop a large-scale loan for
‘‘negotiated,” or ‘‘market-assisted” land reform in the rest of Colombia. Both
independent and World Bank analysts recognized that the implementation of
Colombia’s 1994 land reform law was imposed arbitrarily, biased in favor of better-
off farmers and its transactions were largely secret (Deininger, 1999; Borras, 2003,
2007; Deininger and Lavadenz, 2004 ). The Bank supported a pilot effort ostensibly to
address those problems, to justify a $300 million loan in the design phase. That
project was dropped from the pipeline, however. Its once-public, preparation phase
summary is no longer listed on the World Bank’s Colombia country page (World Bank,
1993). Critics were apparently successful.
42 For longer-term research on the significance of second level federations of
community councils as the principal expression of autonomous institutional power
for Afrodescendants in Colombia’s Pacific region, see Gracia Hincapié (2013); García
Sánchez (2017); Peña et al. (2017); Vélez (2011); Vélez et al. (2019).
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2007)43
KDP was Southeast Asia’s largest ‘‘community-driven develop-
ment” (CDD) project, designed shortly before the 1999 fall of
Indonesia’s New Order dictatorship. Its emphasis on village level
democracy resonated with the national transition to democracy
(Wong & Guggenheim, 2005). KDP architects gained policy lever-
age in the wake of international protest against mega-projects,
drawing on social theory and agrarian studies to design an explicit
participatory institution-building strategy in an effort to address
the authoritarian legacy of patronage and corruption.44
KDP’s block grants invigorated existing, but weak village coun-
cils. KDP deployed a tiered system of trained ‘‘social and engineer-
ing facilitators” to supported participatory village planning
processes that submitted proposals to a competitive review pro-
cess at the subdistrict level (Guggenheim, 2006: 114). Projects
were selected by village representatives who were not part of
the formal executive. Subdistricts (Kecamatan) included 20–50 vil-
lages, with between 10,000 and 75,000 people. Project architects
chose the subdistrict level of government as their key site of inter-
vention because its weakness and prior lack of resources meant
that it was often not already under the entrenched control of local
elites. KDP architects expected local project success to vary
depending on pre-existing levels of village level capacity, which
were studied in detail (Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olson, &
Woolcock, 2004; 200; Gibson & Woolcock, 2008).
KDP’s competitive proposal selection process was intended to
encourage villages to negotiate internally and with each other to
decide which proposals moved forward, including proactive mea-
sures for gender inclusion. Villages could submit two proposals,
and the second had to be from a women’s group (Chavis, 2010:
266). Project monitoring was designed to identify and address cor-
ruption risks with multiple complementary approaches, including
unprecedented village level transparency requirements and the
funding of independent media to play a proactive watchdog role
(Woodhouse, 2005). Where those measures were insufficient, pro-
ject authorities sanctioned or dropped problem districts. Conflict
zones were also closely monitored to determine whether KDP
was contributing to or aggravating tensions. KDP also had to nego-
tiate the revival of traditional customary authorities (adat), in an
effort to offset their tendency to exclude women and the poor.
Yet KDP’s standardized approach to convening ‘‘invited spaces”
limited its capacity to engage in proactive inclusion of the poorest
villagers (Guggenheim, 2006: 131–132).45 As Gibson and Woolcock
put it, ‘‘KDP’s spaces provided open, accessible forums in which
marginalized groups contested the power of governing elites to
make development decisions unilaterally by engaging them in43 This first project ended in 2002 and was followed by two continuous loans
through 2007, so the research discussed here covers the entire period.
44 As KDP’s lead architect put it ‘‘to have social specialists sitting in the belly of the
beast has allowed a translation of ethnographic findings into project designs and
mechanisms. . .” [yet] ‘‘much of the overall impetus to reform the Bank came from the
growing criticism of international groups who no longer accepted the Bank’s self-
perpetuating calculations of the costs and benefits of giant development schemes”
(Guggenheim 2006: 134–135).
45 A pilot civil society-led program started under KDP supported for innovative
leadership training for widows and other female household heads. The Women-
Headed Family Empowerment initiative (PEKKA) is a very unusual case of a World
Bank-incubated project that became a broad national movement (Zulminarni et al.,
2018). According to its founder, Nani Zulminarni: ‘‘[This support] was our blessing,
and we continue [to] grow as an independent movement long after KDP ended — even
though at the end they did not scale it up as we wished. We realized that our
approach and organizing strategy could not be fully implemented with the
bureaucracy, development approach and its procurement system. Becoming an
independent movement, separate from the KDP administration, gave us more
freedom and space to experiment and exercise the community-based approach and
grow grassroots women leaders” (email communication, June 19, 2019).face-to-face relations of deliberative contestation, often for the first
time. The prospect of choosing, managing, and evaluating a shared,
tangible development project provided a material incentive for
engaging in such relation” (2008: 175). Their comparative case anal-
ysis found that ‘‘these spaces, incentives, and resources, in addition
to KDP’s complaints mechanisms, can help incrementally shift power
relations in favor of local marginalized groups” (2008: 159). As Cha-
vis summarized: ‘‘The core idea of KDP is not only to make elite cap-
ture more difficult but to change the cultural and political
environments that make elite capture possible” (2010: 267).
Meanwhile, senior World Bank and government authorities
backed KDP because it injected large amounts of funds to quickly
build numerous public works in low-income regions during a del-
icate political and economic transition. This led to a series of large
follow-on loans and, in 2007, the project’s eventual full transfor-
mation into a national government program (PNPM). This legacy
in turn influenced the 2014 Village Law, which includes provisions
that institutionalize local government participatory budgeting
nationwide.46
KDP was informed and accompanied by an unusually extensive
series of evaluations and scholarly research projects. Social science
field experiments were deployed to test democratic decision-
making innovations and combinations of top-down and bottom-
up anti-corruption audits (Olken, 2007, 2008); post conflict reinte-
gration (Barron, Diprose, & Woolcock, 2001); and community over-
sight of government service delivery. In addition, intensive, large-
scale, multi-sited comparative ethnographic research addressed
whether and how KDP affected conflict. Several regions had
recently had civil conflict and much of the rest of the countryside
experienced pervasive everyday violence. In the latter regions, Bar-
ron, Diprose, and Woolcock found that ‘‘elites have the autonomy
to capture KDP process in the way they do other projects; whether
they do so is a partial measure of KDP’s efficacy in providing con-
straints on elite power” (2011: 115). Because KDP was designed to
encourage a power shift, it generated friction – the question was
whether that conflict was bounded and – in effect – productive.
The most common answer was yes; KDP forums tended to solve
project problems and avoid conflict escalation (Barron, Diprose, &
Woolcock, 2011: 121). Key informants surveyed in two provinces
were asked whether village-level decision-making in KDP areas
had becomemore or less democratic. In one province, 33% reported
‘‘much more democratic,” 44% ‘‘somewhat more democratic,” and
only 3% ‘‘less democratic. In the other, 22% reported ‘‘much more
democratic,” 35% ‘‘somewhat more democratic,” and only 3% ‘‘less
democratic” (2011: 191). Yet numerous studies found that KDP’s
innovations did not influence the rest of village governance; its for-
ums, facilitators and local leaders were not used to address con-
flicts outside the program — in contrast to the hopes of project
architects.47
The most extensive scholarly critique of KDP found ethno-
graphic evidence of elite capture and argued that the program ‘‘en-
visaged empowerment as a product that could be manufactured by
technique” (Li, 2007: 269). KDP’s approach to democratization of46 For example, ‘‘The Village Law, enacted in 2014, incorporated principles and
practices from KDP and PNPM into village government and governance” (https://
localsolutionstopoverty.org/engagementarea/village-law-and-community-empower-
ment.html, accessed May 12, 2019). See also Antlöv, Wetterberg, and Dharmawan
(2016) and Salim et al (2017), among others. Compared to KDP and PNPM, the Village
Law strengthens the power of village heads.
47 See Pollock & Kendrick (2015). As one impact evaluation finds: ‘‘The fact that
institutions other than PNPM do not yet emulate the transparency and governance
features of the program indicates that a key objective of increased social account-
ability is not being met. . . [This] points to the need for a sustained period of
facilitation and a greater emphasis on the skills and institutions of the community
themselves, to build up community capacity for more effective collective action and
demand for better governance” (PNPM, 2012: 3, 6; Voss 2008).
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forms of citizen voice and higher-intensity conflicts outside the
context of local social investment projects, such as where the state
was complicit in conflicts, or where illegal logging provoked pro-
test (Li, 2007).48 Li observes ‘‘KDP’s designers understood very well
that there is little natural solidarity in Indonesia’s villages. Yet they
still believed they could intervene on the side of the poor simply by
insisting on procedures for including their voices, and their choices,
in the planning process” (2008: 114). Yet she also found that ‘‘KDP
was much tighter than the old system — there were far fewer oppor-
tunities to steal funds” (Li, 2008: 114).
KDP deployed an unusually multi-faceted monitoring system,
including support for independent investigative journalists as
watchdogs (Wong, 2003). In spite of efforts, however, this monitor-
ing system was not able to determine the overall relative weights
of elite capture vs democratic transformation scenarios in such a
vast project. Senior staff attention gravitated to the ‘‘tails” of the
distribution in the variation.49 The survey reported above gives a
sense of the range of scenarios, but the results are not based on a
representative sample of the thousands of villages where KDP was
active. These findings underscore the risks, and therefore the rele-
vance of monitoring systems that can identify the nature and fre-
quency of elite capture. As result, the overall mix of democratizing
outcomes vs elite capture is not clear – nor is how scaling up in
the national PNPM program may have affected the quality of the
implementation of KDP’s civic innovations. That said, the available
empirical evidence finds that KDP’s combination of new rules and
incentives enabled a significant, sustained and large-scale transition
to stronger village governance in large parts of the country, eventu-
ally informing participatory budgeting elements in the 2014 national
Village Law.50
The political opportunity for creating some degree of counter-
vailing power included the following elements: bolstering of par-
ticipatory subdistrict councils, grounded in local deliberative
spaces for proposing community development projects and proac-
tive gender inclusion. The project both encouraged and bounded
collective action, with additional leverage provided by trans-
parency and accountability reforms.
6.5. Ecuador: Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development
Project [Prodepine] (1998–2002)
By the 1990s, Ecuador’s indigenous movement had gained
national political influence, combining mass protests to challenge
neoliberal policies with extensive institutionalized power-sharing
in governmental education, health and development agencies.
The national movement was grounded in a dense web of multi-
level indigenous organizations that originated in earlier peasant
land reform struggles and then became key actors in a pan-
ethnic, anti-racist movement (e.g. Pallares, 2002). This context
made possible the Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Devel-
opment Project (Prodepine), which was designed in direct response48 Gibson and Woolcock compared cases of overt protest against abuse of power
with the exercise of voice within KDP and concurred with Li insofar as: ‘‘There is no
obvious bridge between, on the one hand, contestation. . . within decision-making
about KDP resource allocation and, on the other hand, more fundamental and ongoing
challenges to opportunity hoarding of public power by governing elites” (2008: 172).
Yet Gibson and Woolcock did not find cases where KDP somehow muted extra-
institutional protest (2008). In contrast to their focus on agency and contestation,
Carroll’s critique takes a more structuralist approach, recognizing that KDP was more
participatory and less corrupt than other rural development programs while
emphasizing KDP’s compatibility with neoliberalism because of its emphasis on
productive infrastructure investment, microcredit – and its use of competition
between village proposals as a project decision-making principle (Carroll 2009).
49 Scott Guggenheim, former World Bank project manager (email communication,
April 19, 2019)
50 Interview, Sentot Satria, March 28, 2019.to the 1994 national indigenous protest against proposed privati-
zation of communal land and water resources (van Nieuwkoop &
Uquillas, 2000; Treakle, 1998).51
Prodepine became the first stand-alone World Bank project to
focus directly on indigenous and Afrodescendant communities. It
funded local capacity building, demand-driven rural subprojects,
land tenure regularization, cultural heritage activities, and the
institutional strengthening of the Council for the Development of
the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador. This government agency
managed the project, cogoverned with national indigenous organi-
zations in a de facto majority, with the World Bank as broker (van
Nieuwkoop & Uquillas, 2000). This unusual hybrid arrangement
was made possible by the convergence of the national indigenous
movement’s growing political power and the influence of social
development specialists within the World Bank.
Independent analysts differ over whether Prodepine’s co-
governance process and its focus on strengthening self-managed,
autonomous ethnic organizations was an institutional concession
to protest — or a deliberate effort to weaken and divide the indige-
nous movement (Griffiths, 2000; Guatemal, 2006; ICCI, 2001).
Waves of national protest and political instability persisted during
project implementation, and Prodepine ended up getting caught in
the crossfire (Walsh, 2001). World Bank project managers sought
to apply technical rather than political criteria to funding decisions
and to sustain a pluralistic co-governance and resource allocation
process in a context where Ecuador’s largest indigenous confeder-
ation, CONAIE, claimed to represent 70% of the country’s indige-
nous population (Uquillas & van Nieuwkoop, 2003: 14). The
governance structure of Prodepine and its host agency became
contested terrain; some CONAIE advocates questioned power-
sharing with other ethnic confederations, while an emerging
national debate over different forms of indigenous representation
counterposed organizations based on ‘‘nationality” or ‘‘people-
hood” vs those based on territorial, class and religious affinities
(Lucero, 2008). For some critics, the project’s neutrality during high
profile national political conflicts was considered evidence of its
divisive intentions (ICCI, 2001).
In practice, Prodepine’s primary focus was on Ecuador’s second-
level, self-managed indigenous-led membership organizations
focused on regional social and economic development – and on
bolstering the capacity of the new hybrid government agency that
funded them (Bebbington & Carroll, 2000; Carroll, 2002).52 Two-
thirds of the second-level organizations funded had already been
in operation for more than five years, two-thirds included more than
10 grassroots organizations, and 60% were multi-ethnic (Carroll,
2002: 442-443). Prodepine also created incentives for informal
community-based ethnic affinity organizations to form their own
second-level organizations.53 Most funded organizations pursued
both advocacy and economic goals, though some focused on just
one or the other (Carroll, 2002). The project’s academic critics con-
tended that its focus on more consolidated second-level indigenous
membership organizations favored relatively better-off communities
and leaders with more formal education, reinforcing ‘‘projectism,”
fragmentation and less overtly politicized agendas (Bretón, 2005a,
2005b, 2007, 2008, 2014, 2015; Larrea Maldonado, 2010; Martínez
Valle, 2006). Indeed, diverse analysts agree that funding private51 For a movement strategist’s assessment of that protest’s limited bargaining power
and partial blunting of government efforts to privatize communal lands and water,
see Pacari (1996).
52 Representation of indigenous peoples in the lowland Amazon region took
different forms (Lucero, 2008: 148–149).
53 For example, Prodepine’s central role in encouraging the formation of the first
Afro-Ecuadorian second level peasant organization with a political agenda is well-
documented in the case of the 38 communities that constituted the Federation of
Black Communities and Organizations of Imbabura y Carchi (FECONIC) (Zambrano
Murillo 2011: 16, 70-71). Thanks to Carlos de la Torre for this reference.
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entiation trends – and the relative mix of such projects funded by
Prodepine is not clear (Carroll, 2002; Martínez Valle, 2006).
In practice, Prodepine went beyond narrowly economic devel-
opment projects, venturing into more political terrain by support-
ing third-level federations and fourteen municipalities that were
governed by a new national indigenous political party (Andolina,
Laurie, & Radcliffe, 2009: 90).54 In contrast to previous government
rural development programs widely associated with clientelistic
exclusion of independent grassroots organizations (e.g., PRONADER),
69% of the almost 1600 local level projects reportedly went to affil-
iates of CONAIE (World Bank, 2003b: 7). Prodepine also funded the
‘‘legalization” (titling) of more than 252,000 ha of indigenous and
Afrodescendant community lands, accompanied by trained grass-
roots paralegals – though the government did not provide the coun-
terpart funding needed to address highland land conflicts through
purchases (Nieto Cabrera, 2004, World Bank, 2003b). The project’s
primary focus on tangible measures to strengthen autonomous,
large-scale membership organizations differs from the official
reforms limited to the ‘‘minimal package of cultural rights” known
at the time as as ‘‘neoliberal multiculturalism” (Hale, 2002).55
At CONAIE’s 2001 national congress, their demands included
structural changes in Prodepine and its implementing agency,
including strengthening the role of ‘‘nationalities and peoples” in
both staffing and project funding allocation in a planned follow-
on project (CONAIE, 2001: 4). By 2005, a debate within CONAIE
led a majority of affiliate federations to reject a Prodepine succes-
sor project, so the government cancelled it (World Bank, 2006).
Their reasons included concern with increased state capacity to
intervene in the organizations, the amount of spending on admin-
istration and consultancies, and emphasis of project funding for
market access over production, in the broad context of fears of
co-optation into economic paradigms that they opposed politically
(Andolina, Laurie, & Radcliffe, 2009: 238–239). Other ethnic con-
federations favored continuation of the project. Governmental
power-sharing with national indigenous confederations survived
the end of the World Bank role, including the government agency
that operated Prodepine. Subsequently, however, centralizing
‘‘postneoliberal” national politicians rolled back institutionalized
indigenous power-sharing in government agencies (Martínez
Novo, 2013; 2014; Mijelski & Beck, 2011).
The key political opportunity for bolstering countervailing
power involved the creation of a hybrid national agency, co-
managed by autonomous national indigenous organizations, to
fund local projects via diverse regional membership organizations.
This leverage did not extend to influencing national economic poli-
cies that undermined the viability of smallholder production
(Martínez Valle 2003). Prodepine’s longer-term impact on the
enfranchisement of excluded constituencies and the construction
of countervailing power had contradictory results. On balance,
the project appears to have strengthened core regional building
block second-level membership organizations that link local to
national indigenous organizations – while also contributing to54 The authors of a survey of second-level organizations at the time suggested that
‘‘the second-level organizations delegated the tasks of representation to the national
and provincial organizations for making the indigenous movement’s political
demands, while the second-level organizations concentrated more directly on
development actions in the microregional arena and were connected to political
action through their linkages with the national organizations” (Larrea, et al 2002: 15-
16, cited in Bretón, 2005: 74).
55 The project also funded large numbers of scholarships to open indigenous access
to higher education and professional positions in the project itself – which led to
friction between conventional and intercultural approaches to education (Laurie,
Andolina & Radcliffe 2005). At the time, paying professional salaries to indigenous
staff provoked criticism – as suggested by the pejorative term ‘‘golden ponchos”
(Andolina, Laurie, & Radcliffe, 2009: 74).political friction between and within federations over how to
engage with the state and markets.7. Comparative analysis: mechanisms, processes and outcomes
Each case analysis 1) identified tangible mechanisms that
addressed countervailing power, going beyond conventional
superficial approaches, 2) analyzed subsequent processes of con-
testation and 3) assessed their mixed results, within the limits of
the available retrospective evidence. Stepping back from the cases,
the following section identifies nine broader patterns in the land-
scape of contested terrain (see Table 2). Some of these findings
address specific mechanisms that were considered to be key at
the time, such as power-sharing over allocation of social funds,
while others involve enabling measures that were later recognized
as important in the emerging practitioner "field" of transparency,
participation and accountability, such as proactive disclosure of
project information and grievance redress.
1) Relevant project-related political opportunities were targeted to
excluded constituencies
In each case, political changes in national context created space,
most notably transitions to democracy, new constitutions or waves
of protest. Yet those openings in national capitals were necessary
but far from sufficient to drive changes in the state that could reach
subnational, often peripheral regions.56 Each project deployed mea-
sures whose openings tangibly reached specific excluded social con-
stituencies, often in targeted territories. The identification of these
patterns confirms the relevance of operationalizing the concept of
‘‘political opportunity” by focusing on how targeted openings
enabled collective action for specific constituencies, in contrast to
the conventional framing of political opportunities in generic terms
(cf Meyer & Minkoff, 2004).
2) Where projects contributed to countervailing power, they
deployed two principal mechanisms
The project actions that were relevant to countervailing power
fell into two main categories: 1) institutionalized power-sharing
over allocation of social funds and 2) direct support for scaled-up
representative social organizations – including funding, recogni-
tion of legitimacy and, perhaps most importantly, collective titling
of territories (see below and Table 2). Both kinds of measures are
significantly more ambitious than conventional approaches to par-
ticipatory development, which involve ‘‘light touch” consultations,
because they involve at least incipient checks and balances. This is
consistent with the findings of the experimental literature on gov-
ernance reform, which suggest that ‘‘voice without teeth” gener-
ates little leverage (Fox, 2015). Yet the key power-shifting
elements of power-sharing over funding decisions in these projects
were based on rules rather than laws, and were therefore vulnera-
ble to rollback.
3) Power-sharing over social fund decision-makings operated at
different scales
Projects supported power-sharing with social leaders in alloca-
tion of government social funds at multiple scales: at the national
level in Ecuador, state level in Rondônia, subdistrict level in56 These projects’ alignment with national political dynamics and their brokering
with stakeholders was consistent with the approach now called ‘‘Thinking and
Working Politically” (e.g., Dasandi et al., 2019). Yet other key characteristics of TWP
were absent from most of these cases – such as iterative problem-solving approaches
and flexible funding.
Table 2
Tangible, targeted political opportunities that contributed to countervailing power.
Note: Shading signals qualitative assessment of varying degrees of intensity.
58 This is consistent with Gaventa and Barrett’s meta-analysis of 100 cases of
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opened up budget decision-making in existing local governments,
as in Indonesia and Mexico, they constituted participatory budget-
ing – in contrast to power-sharing funding bodies that were lim-
ited to project enclaves in Brazil and Ecuador.57 In Ecuador, the
hybrid national agency’s funding for indigenous municipal govern-
ments was quite modest, ad hoc and temporary. In Brazil’s state of
Rondônia, state government power-sharing over resource allocation
was limited, brief and unaccountable. In Indonesia’s KDP, in contrast,
participatory subdistrict councils were backed up by proactive mea-
sures to bolster voice and oversight from below – though a subse-
quent national Village Law strengthened executive authorities
(while retaining some participatory elements). Early on, KDP appears
to have encouraged more of a pro-village power shift because it
deployed field organizers (known as ‘‘facilitators”), though that field
presence weakened as the program scaled up. In Mexico, more fund-
ing for municipalities was supposed to be accompanied by participa-
tory decision-making. New rules that provided unprecedented
official legitimacy for village claims to municipal authorities were
rarely implemented beyond one state – and were then vetoed by a
subsequent national law. In Ecuador, Indonesia and Mexico, project
design required villages to compete with each other to apply for
social funds (‘‘deliberative contestation”), which may have blocked
incentives for villages to unite to constitute a form of countervailing
power vis-à-vis the higher levels of government that controlled
resource allocation. In none of these cases did participation influence57 On definitions of participatory budgeting, see Peixoto (2012).national policy decisions, power-sharing was limited to deciding
which local projects to fund.
Mansuri and Rao’s extensive evidence review concluded with
the question of whether ‘‘mandated inclusion” in community-
driven development initiatives improved their effectiveness, as in
the case of quotas for women in India’s local governments (2013:
292). The findings here suggest that at least in less institutionalized
settings, where subnational governments often do not follow offi-
cial rules, autonomous forms of countervailing power outside of
official resource allocation venues are relevant because they can
bolster capacity to question authority – as well as to monitor pro-
ject funding decisions.58
4) Countervailing power was manifested in scaled-up autonomous
social organizations, especially where accompanied by collec-
tive titling of ethnic territories
Where externally-supported government programs provided
direct support for scaled-up, autonomous, representative social
organizations, they did so in three ways. Two were tangible –
direct funding and collective ethnically-based titling to consolidate
their land base. The third was intangible – public recognition of
their legitimacy as interlocutors vis-à-vis the state. In Colombia,
Brazil, and in Ecuador, projects supported scaled-up, multi-levelcollective action, which concluded: ‘‘citizen engagement through local associations
and social movements emerged as more important sources of change than formal
participatory governance spaces, with associations showing the highest percentage of
positive outcomes” (Gaventa and Barrett, 2012: 2407).
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and Brazil, this form of organization was in turn grounded in col-
lective titling of territories.59 Scaled-up social organizations were
necessary – though not sufficient – to defend those landholdings
against multiple threats, especially in the absence of law enforce-
ment. Meso-level regional social organizations constitute forms of
countervailing power both because they have more bargaining
power with governmental or private sector elites than do
community-level organizations – and because of their potential
capacity to hold allied political organizations accountable (such as
national confederations).60
5) Projects took substantial actions for ethnic inclusion, but not for
gender inclusion
Projects in Ecuador, Colombia and Brazil supported unprece-
dented ethnic inclusion measures, while the Mexico project’s mea-
sures had contradictory outcomes depending on context. The
evidence review found no evidence of proactive gender inclusion.
Indeed, in Mexico, the indigenous community governance institu-
tions that constituted countervailing power were often completely
male-dominated. Only KDP in Indonesia took measures to enable
countervailing power with gender inclusion, with both project
rules and targeted support for what is now a national association
of women-headed families.
6) Participatory project innovations were made possible by
national openings, but unfolded in regions where social actors
lacked strong national political allies
Ambitious project design was clearly enabled when architects
‘‘caught the wave” of a political opening – as in Colombia, Indone-
sia and Ecuador. In Colombia, for example, a then-new national law
allowed World Bank officials to require that the loan support col-
lective titling of Afro-Colombian and indigenous territories. Yet
national allies within the state were still usually too weak to proac-
tively weaken forces opposed to participation and accountability.
Rare exceptions included World Bank project managers support
for advocates’ calls for the removal of Colombian agrarian officials
who blocked collective land titling, as well as funding cutoffs in
high corruption Indonesian subdistricts. Recall the findings of
Mansuri and Rao’s meta-analysis regarding the key means to offset
powerful tendencies toward elite capture: strong central govern-
ment oversight and robust transparency and accountability mea-
sures (2013: 287). Those key features were missing in four of the
five projects, constraining their long-term impact (KDP is the
exception).
7) The enabling potential of official participatory spaces was con-
strained by the lack of complementary transparency and
accountability reforms
These projects predated the rise of the international trans-
parency and accountability agenda. Only the Indonesia social funds59 In contrast to historic approaches to land reform, such as land to the tiller, this
collective titling involved territory – which can form the basis for some degree of self-
government. This included both ethnic ancestral domain, and sustainable land use as
in the case of rubber-tappers. In contrast, most 20th-century land reforms, in spite of
their diverse ideologies, involved state control of ‘‘beneficiaries” and lacked counter-
vailing power from below. Space does not permit a full treatment of this distinction
here.
60 For studies that stress the significance of meso-level mass membership organi-
zations of the excluded for participation to have substantive impacts on states and
markets, see Chen et al. (2007) and Esman and Uphoff (1984). On the dynamics of
leadership accountability within scaled-up membership organizations, see Fox
(2007).proactively emphasized the consistent application of new trans-
parency and accountability rules for project decisions, as well as
multiple anti-corruption measures and a functioning grievance
redress mechanism. In the Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador cases,
contestation over the projects did trigger significant mid-term
reviews that became public and strengthened the hand of both
pro-participation policymakers and advocates. All the projects also
commissioned either evaluations or research whose findings even-
tually became public. Yet none of the projects emphasized proac-
tive public disclosure of relevant, comparable, disaggregated and
actionable information about project performance.
8) The enabling potential of official participatory spaces was con-
strained by the lack of complementary human rights
protections.
At the time of these projects, international donors did not proac-
tively address the rule of law.More specifically, none of the projects
proactively invested in protections to address possible threats of
reprisals. Yet in these project settings, vocal advocates of pro-
poor power shifts could risk their lives for questioning authority.61
Even today, official donor transparency and accountability agendas
are rarely linked to investments in the defense of human rights.
9) Ostensibly participatory project-related institutions were the
targets of protest and advocacy, with diverse official responses
The most extreme case of protest against project-backed insti-
tutions was in Chiapas, where the Zapatista rebellion exposed
(World Bank-funded) municipal governments as tools of authori-
tarian elites. In Ecuador, the project itself was a concession to
indigenous mass protest, followed by contestation over the terms
of indigenous representation in its co-governance. The Brazil pro-
ject was also a concession to an advocacy campaign, followed by
broken promises for inclusion that led advocates to make official
accountability claims. In Indonesia, rural social movements were
rare and the project addressed grassroots claims that fit within
its focus on local social investments. The project with the clearest
contribution to movement-building was in Colombia, where pres-
sure from both above and below converged to push through
large-scale titling of ethnic territories.62
To synthesize these findings, Table 2 depicts the varied pres-
ence of the two main kinds of targeted political opportunities that
were most relevant to bolstering countervailing power for the
excluded: power-sharing institutions for allocating social funds
and direct support for land-based social organizations. Table 2 also
includes an assessment of the degree to which key reforms were
carried out that could enable collective action (cf Joshi & Moore,
2000). Qualitative assessments of the degree to which these mech-
anisms for creating openings were actually put into practice are
indicated by the degree of shading in the table’s cells. To sum up
these findings: most relevant power-sharing measures for allocat-
ing social funds were not institutionalized and therefore especially
vulnerable to rollback, while few accountability reforms bolstered
the public sector’s ‘‘teeth” that are needed to respond effectively to
‘‘voice.” The most widely-shared form of progress involved ethnic
inclusion to bolster representative social organizations. KDP in
Indonesia stands out because it deployed the most comprehensive61 Even in usually less harsh Ecuador, land conflicts faced violent repression in the
early 1990s (North, Kit, & Koep, 2003).
62 The available evidence is insufficient to resolve how to interpret the ‘‘net”
political impact of the proposal-driven social funds in Ecuador and Indonesia. Such
debates are emblematic of a broader counterfactual puzzle: does participation in
official decisions to fund local development projects necessarily pre-empt extra-
institutional protest?
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vailing power, albeit bounded to allocating local social funds.
8. On Contradiction: analytical and methodological challenges
This historical evidence shows that even projects from unlikely
aid agencies can contribute to targeted openings from above that
can in turn bolster contextually-specific forms of countervailing
power. At the same time, outcomes were always mixed. Opposing
forces managed to reverse, block or contain the most significant
innovations. That said, for autonomous social organizations there
is a major difference between rollback vs. containment of progress
towards countervailing power (e.g., Mexico and Brazil cases vs.
Colombia and Ecuador). This points to two specific challenges that
are relevant for analysis of contemporary aid agency agendas,
especially as they increasingly focus on fragile and violent settings:
1) International development projects can have contradictory ef-
fects on countervailing power for the excluded. This idea refers
specifically to interaction effects, in which some project mea-
sures actively conflict with others. That is distinct from the
simultaneous process of variation along an implicit contin-
uum, in which outcomes are stronger in some areas than
others, or some project elements work better than others.
Planafloro in Brazil responded to international advocacy pro-
test by briefly supporting local CSOs, small farmer, indige-
nous and rubber-tapper organizations and demarcating
collective territories — without protecting them from pre-
dictable backlash. On balance, the project appears to have
ended up bolstering the patronage capacity of state political
elites. In Mexico’s rural municipal funds, new entitlements
for outlying villages emboldened them to hold their munic-
ipal governments accountable, at least in Oaxaca. Yet the
same municipal funds program had the opposite effect in
Chiapas by increasing funding for authoritarian mayors
before the rebellion and siding with counterinsurgency
efforts afterwards. In Ecuador, the project responded to
indigenous protest by creating a precedent-setting power-
sharing body that directly funded representative, scaled-up
organizations, yet it got caught in political crossfire between
indigenous organizations of different political affiliations
and appears to have accentuated differences between more
ideological national leaders and second-level organizations
that prioritized socio-economic concerns.
2) Contradictory effects pose methodological challenges: how to
assess their relative weights?” The empirical limitations of
this retrospective evidence review underscore the challenge
of determining the relative weights of elite capture vs. coun-
tervailing power outcomes – within the same project.63 For
practitioners concerned with minimizing the risk of violating
first-do-no-harm principles, such monitoring needs to happen
in real time, at scale. Official mid-term project reviews in Bra-
zil, Colombia and Ecuador identified major failures that were
then partly addressed. At least in the Indonesia and Ecuador
cases, extensive project monitoring systems identified both
problems and progress, though not the relative scope of these
different outcomes. The ambitious goal of measuring what are
necessarily partial, uneven and often subjective power shifts
across vast territories and large populations poses many
unanswered questions. This monitoring agenda requires
locally-adapted yet reliable and consistent indicators, institu-63 The question of how recent UK Aid project monitoring and evaluation systems
address this issue is a focus of the ongoing Action for Empowerment and
Accountability research project (cf Anderson, Fox, & Gaventa, 2020).tional autonomy and a substantial, sustained investment of
political capital – all of which tend to conflict with dominant
incentives in both aid agencies and governments. Moreover,
for such monitoring to actually contribute to countervailing
power in practice, the results need to be targeted to reach rel-
evant stakeholders with capacity to act.64
9. Conclusions
This study engages empirically with the classic theoretical ques-
tion of the contested relationship between structure and agency by
comparing unlikely cases of change in inhospitable settings. The
evidence review assesses whether and how externally-funded gov-
ernment projects bolstered contextually-specific forms of counter-
vailing power — as well as whether such changes survived the test
of time. All five anomalous projects did enable collective action
from below, though in partial and uneven ways. Over the longer
term, their most ambitious power-shifting elements were either
reversed (Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador), watered down (Indonesia) or
contained (Colombia). Yet these differences mattered for social
actors on the ground. Scaled-up autonomous mass organizations,
especially those grounded in collective landholdings, appear to
have been more sustainable than the attempts to change rules to
democratize decision-making about allocating social funds.
These findings inform conceptual, analytical and methodologi-
cal propositions that are relevant for addressing how action can
push back against usually-dominant structural constraints. All
involve rethinking umbrella terms.
 First, the concept of countervailing power addresses the
absence of accountability from the conventional approaches to
participatory development or citizen engagement. Voice is not
enough. Actors or institutions with capacity to constrain the
abuse of power matter.
 Second, the broad concept of ‘‘political opportunities” and its
relevance for collective action can be more tractable for com-
parative analysis if it is operationalized with greater consis-
tency. This study focused on targeted, tangible measures that
reached specific social constituencies at scale.
 Third, the common-sense term ‘‘mixed results” is too broad, it
refers to both varied and conflicting outcomes. Both the nature
and dynamics of ‘‘mixed results” inform this study’s principal
analytical finding: projects can have contradictory effects. This
idea goes beyond simply varied results because it emphasizes
the interaction between conflicting actions within the same pro-
gram. Inertial actions can block innovative actions — even in the
same project.
 Fourth, measuring both varied and contradictory results pose an
unresolved methodological challenge because of the difficulty
with determining their relative weights.
To sum up, for aid agencies to heed first-do-no-harm principles,
real-time, independent monitoring that can identify and measure
both countervailing power and elite capture is essential. Timely,
targeted public disclosure of relevant, actionable information to
stakeholders, in their own languages, would be a step in that
direction.Declaration of interests
The writing of this paper was funded by the Action for Empow-
erment and Accountability project, an international research con-64 On ‘‘targeted transparency,” see Fung, Graham & Weil (2007).
J. Fox /World Development 132 (2020) 104978 15sortium led by the Institute for Development Studies funded by UK
Aid (DFID). DFID was not involved with this specific study.
Regarding the World Bank, a subject of the paper, the author’s
work relationships since the 1992-1994 study cited in the article
have been limited to a commissioned book chapter in 2004, a brief
research consultancy in 2015 for the Global Partnership for Social
Accountability, co-authorship of a background paper for the 2016
World Development Report and service as an external member of
a review panel for its Independent Evaluation Group in 2017. No
current World Bank staff member was involved with this study.Acknowledgements
This study was carried out as part of the Action for Empower-
ment and Accountability research consortium, led by the Institute
for Development Studies and funded by the UK Department
of International Development. See https://www.ids.ac.uk/pro-
gramme-and-centre/action-for-empowerment-and-accountability-
a4ea/. Translations are by the author. Thanks very much for precise
comments on earlier versions from two external reviewers, Joy
Aceron, Carlos de la Torre, Julia Fischer-Mackey, John Gaventa, John
Garrison, Scott Guggenheim, John Heath, Margaret Keck, Amalia
Pallares, Jesse Ribot, Helmer Quiñones, Helen Shapiro, Warren
Van Wicklin and Nani Zulminarni. Responsibility for interpreta-
tions lies exclusively with the author.References
Agnew, J., & Oslender, U. (2013). Overlapping territorialities, sovereignty in dispute:
Empirical lessons from Latin America. In W. Nicholls, B. Miller, & J. Beaumont
(Eds.), Spaces of contention: Spatialities and social movements (pp. 121–140).
Dorchester: Ashgate.
Agrawal, A., & Ribot, J. (1999). Accountability in decentralization: A framework with
South Asian and African cases. Journal of Developing Areas, 33, 473–502.
Agudelo, C. E. (2002). Etnicidad negra y elecciones en Colombia. Journal of Latin
American Anthropology, 7(2), 168–197.
Alves, V., Bandeira Cardozo, I., Caminha, L., Glass, V., Inês Hargreaves, M., Leroy, J. P.,
et al. (2008). O fim da floresta? Devastação das Unidades de Conservação e Terras
Indígenas do Estado de Rondônia. Porto Velho, Brazil: Grupo de Trabalho
Amazônico.
Alsop, R., Bertelson, M., & Holland, J. (2006). Empowerment in practice: From analysis
to implementation. Washington: World Bank.
Andrews, M. (2015). Explaining positive deviance in public sector reforms in
development. World Development, 74, 197–208.
Antlöv, H., Wetterberg, A., & Dharmawan, L. (2016). Village governance, community
life, and the 2014 Village Law in Indonesia. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic
Studies, 52(2), 161–183.
Asher, K. (2009). Black and green: Afro-Colombians, development, and nature in the
Pacific Lowlands. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Anderson, C., Fox, J., & Gaventa, J. (2020). How do donor-led empowerment and
accountability activities take scale into account? Evidence from DFID
programmes in contexts of fragility, conflict, and violence, IDS Working Paper,




Aycrigg, M. (1998). Participation and the World Bank: Successes, constraints, and
responses. Social Development Papers; no. 29. Washington, D.C.: The World
Bank, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/373911468767354995/
Participation-and-the-World-Bank-successes-constraints-and-responses.
Ballvé, T. (2013). Grassroots masquerades: Development, paramilitaries, and land
laundering in Colombia. Geoforum, 50, 62–75.
Barron, P., Diprose, R., & Woolcock, M. (2011). Contesting development: Participatory
projects and local conflict dynamics in Indonesia. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Bebbington, A., & Carroll, T. (2000). Induced social capital and federations of the
rural poor, Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 19, March, Washington, D.
C.: World Bank, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development
Network. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.493.8699&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
Bebbington, A., Dharmawan, L., Fahmi, E., & Guggenheim, S. (2004). Village politics,
culture and community-driven development: Insights from Indonesia. Progress
in Development Studies, 4(3), 187–205.
Bebbington, A., Dharmawan, L., Fahmi, E., & Guggenheim, S. (2006). Local capacity,
village governance, and the political economy of rural development in
Indonesia. World Development, 34(11), 1958–1976.Bebbington, A., Guggenheim, S., Olson, E., & Woolcock, M. (2004). Exploring social
capital debates at the World Bank. Journal of Development Studies, 40(5), 33–64.
Bebbington, A., Woolcock, M., Guggenheim, S.E, & Olson E. (Eds.) (2006). The search
for empowerment: Social capital as idea and practice at the World Bank,
Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/what-
does-evidence-tell-us-about-‘thinking-and-working-politically’-development.
Bennett, A., & Checkel, J. T. (Eds.). (2015). Process tracing: From metaphor to analytic
tool. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Blackburn, J., & Holland, J. (Eds.). (1998). Who changes? Institutionalizing
participation in development. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
Blackburn, J., Chambers, R., & Gaventa, J. (2002). Mainstreaming participation in
development. In N. Hanna & R. Picciotto (Eds.), Making development work:
Development learning in a world of poverty and wealth (pp. 61–82). New
Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers.
Borras, S. (2003). Questioning market-led agrarian reform: Experiences from Brazil,
Colombia and South Africa. Journal of Agrarian Change, 3(3), 367–394.
Borras, S. (2007). Pro-poor land reform: A critique. Ottawa: University of Ottawa
Press.
Bretón, V. (2005a). Capital social y etnodesarrollo en los Andes. Quito, Ecuador: CAAP.
Bretón, V. (2005b). Los paradigmas de la ‘nueva’ ruralidad a debate: El proyecto de
desarrollo de los pueblos indígenas y negros del Ecuador. Revista Europea de
Estudios Latinoamericanos y Del Caribe, 78, 7–30.
Bretón, V. (2007). A vueltas con el neo-indigenismo etnófago: La experiencia
Prodepine o los límites del multiculturalismo neoliberal: On ethnofagic neo-
indigenism: The Prodepine experience or the limits of neoliberal
multiculturalism. Iconos, 29, 95–104.
Bretón, V. (2008). From agrarian reform to ethnodevelopment in the highlands of
Ecuador. Journal of Agrarian Change, 8(4), 583–617.
Bretón, V. (2014). Tempest in the Andes? Part 1: Agrarian reform and peasant
differentiation in Cotopaxi (Ecuador). Journal of Agrarian Change, 15(1), 89–115.
Bretón, V. (2015). Tempest in the Andes? Part 2: Peasant organization and
development agencies in Cotopaxi (Ecuador). Journal of Agrarian Change, 15
(2), 179–200.
Brown, D., Brown, J., & Desposato, S. (2007). Promoting and preventing political
change through internationally funded NGO activity. Latin American Research
Review, 42(1), 126–138.
Brown, D., Brown, J., & Desposato, S. (2008). Who gives, who receives, and who
wins?: Transforming capital into political change through nongovernmental
organizations. Comparative Political Studies, 41(1), 24–47.
Browder, J. O. (2002). Conservation and development projects in the Brazilian
Amazon: Lessons from the Community Initiative Program in Rondônia.
Environmental Management, 29(6), 750–762.
Browder, J. O., Pedlowski, M. A., & Walker, R. (2008). Revisiting theories of frontier
expansion in the Brazilian Amazon: A survey of the colonist farming population
in Rondônia’s post-frontier, 1992–2002. World Development, 36(8), 1469–1492.
Burguete Cal y Mayor, A. & Leyva Solano, X. (Eds.) (2007) La remunicipalización de
Chiapas: Lo político y la política en tiempos de contrainsurgencia, Mexico: Miguel
Angel Porrúa/CIESAS.
Burguete Cal y Mayor, Y. (2012). El municipio: Un actor inesperado en la coyuntura
zapatista. In J. Hernández-Díaz & A. Selee (Eds.), Organización política y
gobernabilidad en territorios indígenas en América Latina (pp. 219–250).
Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa.
Campbell, S. (2018). Global governance and local peace: Accountability and
performance in international peacebuilding. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Cárdenas, R. (2012). Green multiculturalism: Articulations of ethnic and
environmental politics in a Colombian ‘black community’. Journal of Peasant
Studies, 39(2), 309–333.
Caren, N. (2007). Political process theory. In G. Ritzer (Ed.), Blackwell encyclopedia of
sociology. Wiley-Blackwell: Hoboken.
Carroll, T. (Ed.). (2002). Construyendo capacidades colectivas: Fortalecimiento
organizativo de las federaciones campesino-indígenas en la sierra ecuatoriana.
Quito: RISPERGRAF.
Carroll, T. (2009). ‘Social Development’ as Neoliberal Trojan Horse: The World Bank
and the Kecamatan Development Program in Indonesia. Development and
Change, 40(3), 447–466.
Cernea, M. (1983). ‘‘A social methodology for community participation in local
investments: The experience of Mexico’s PIDER Program”World Bank Staff Working
Paper, No. 598. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Cernea, M. (1992). The building blocks of participation: testing bottom-up planning.
World Bank Discussion Papers; no. 166. Washington, DC: World Bank.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/619531468776771678/The-
building-blocks-of-participation-testing-bottom-up-planning.
Chavis, L. (2010). Decentralizing development: Allocating public goods via
competition. Journal of Development Economics, 93, 264–274.
Chen, M., Jhabvala, R., Kabur, R., & Richards, C. (Eds.). (2007). Membership-based
organizations of the poor. London: Routledge.
Clark, D., Fox, J., & Treakle, K. (2003). Demanding accountability: Civil society claims
and the World Bank Inspection Panel. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. https://
jonathanfoxucsc.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/demandingaccountability1.pdf.
CONAIE (2001). Primer congreso de las nacionalidades y pueblos del Ecuador:
Demandas y resoluciones (p. 12). Quito: Confederación de las Nacionalidades y
Pueblos Indígenas del Ecuador.
Cornelius, W., Craig, A., & Fox, J. (Eds.) (1994). Transforming state-society relations in
Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy. La Jolla: UCSD, Center for U.S.- Mexican
Studies
16 J. Fox /World Development 132 (2020) 104978Cooke, B., & Kothari, U. (Eds.). (2001). Participation: The new tyranny? London: Zed.
Corbridge, S., Williams, G., Srinivastava, M., & Veron, R. (2005). Seeing the state:
Governance and Governmentality in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cornwall, A. (2002). Making spaces, changing places: Situating participation in
development IDS Working Paper 170. Brighton, U.K: Institute for Development
Studies.
Cornwall, A. (Ed.) (2004). New democratic spaces? IDS Bulletin 35(2). https://
bulletin.ids.ac.uk/index.php/idsbo/issue/view/76.
Cornwall, A., & Coehlo, V. (2006.). Spaces for change? The politics of citizen
participation in new democratic arenas. London: Zed Books.
Dasandi, N., Laws, E., Marquette, H., & Robinson, M. (2019). What does the evidence
tell us about ‘thinking and working politically’ in development assistance? WIDER
Working Paper 2019/12, March. https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/what-
does-evidence-tell-us-about-‘thinking-and-working-politically’-development.
Davis, S., Uquillas, J., & Eltz, M. (2004). Lessons of indigenous development in Latin
America: The proceedings of a World Bank workshop on indigenous peoples
developmentWorld Bank: Latin American & Caribbean. Region..
Deininger, K., & Lavadenz, I. (2004). Colombia: Land policy in transition. en breve. No.
55. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Deininger, K. (1999). Making negotiated land reform work: initial experience from
Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper,
No. 2040. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/
10.1596/1813-9450-2040.
Díaz Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B., & Ruiz Euler, A. (2014). Traditional governance,
citizen engagement, and local public goods: Evidence from Mexico. World
Development, 53, 80–93.
Eisenstadt, T. (2011). Politics, identity and Mexico’s indigenous rights movements. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Escobar, A. (2008). Territories of difference: Place, movements, life, ‘redes’. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Evans, P. (1996). Government action, social capital and development: Reviewing the
evidence on synergy. World Development, 24(6), 1119–1132.
Feeney, P. (1998). Accountable aid: Local participation in major projects. Oxford:
Oxfam GB.
Frente Indígena de Organizaciones Binacionales/Comunica (2014). Memoria del
taller: Acceso a la información y transparencia de los recursos municipalesMexican
Rural Development Reports, 24. Washington: Wilson Center Mexico Institute.
Esman, N., & Uphoff, M. (1984). Local organizations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Fox, J. (1992). The politics of food in Mexico: State power and social mobilization.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. https://jonathanfoxucsc.files.wordpress.com/
2018/12/Fox_The_Politics_of_Food_in_Mexico.pdf.
Fox, J. (1994). Targeting the poorest: The role of the National Indigenous Institute in
Mexico’s National Solidarity Program, in Cornelius, W; Craig, A. & Fox, J. (Eds.),
Transforming state-society relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy. La
Jolla: UCSD, Center for U.S.- Mexican Studies, pp. 179–216. https://escholarship.
org/uc/item/1cp0w33z.
Fox, J. (1996). How does civil society thicken?: The political construction of social
capital in rural Mexico. World Development, 24(6), 1089–1103. https://
jonathanfoxucsc.files.wordpress.com/2011/
11/fox_how_does_civil_society_thicken_1996.pdf.
Fox, J. (1997). The World Bank and social capital: Contesting the concept in practice.
Journal of International Development, 9(7), 963–971. https://
jonathanfoxucsc.files.wordpress.com/2011/
11/fox_world_bank_and_social_capital_jnl_intl_development_1997.pdf.
Fox, J. (1998). When does reform policy influence practice? Lessons from the
Bankwide Resettlement Review. In J. Fox & L. D. Brown (Eds.), The struggle for
accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and grassroots movements (pp. 303–344).
Cambridge: MIT Press. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7b01k76j.
Fox, J. (2000). Los flujos y reflujos de préstamos sociales y ambientales del Banco
Mundial en México. In A. Alvarez Béjar, N. Klahn, F. Manchon, & P. Castillo (Eds.),
Las nuevas fronteras del siglo XXI: Dimensiones culturales, políticas y
socioeconómicas de las relaciones Mexico-Estados Unidos (pp. 605–639). Mexico
City: UNAM/La Jornada Ediciones. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/84n4s438.
Fox, J. (2007). Accountability politics: Power and voice in rural Mexico. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Fox, J. (2015). Social accountability: What does the evidence really say? World
Development, 72, 346–361. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0305750X15000704.
Fox, J. (2016). Scaling accountability through vertically integrated civil society policy
monitoring and advocacy. IDS Working Paper. https://accountabilityresearch.
org/publication/scaling-accountability-through-vertically-integrated-civil-
society-policy-monitoring-and-advocacy/.
Fox, J., & Aranda, J. (1996). Decentralization and rural development in Mexico:
Community participation in Oaxaca’s Municipal Funds program. La Jolla::
University of California, San Diego, Center for US-Mexican Studies. https://
escholarship.org/uc/item/5jk3b9gt.
Fox, J., & Brown, L. D. (Eds.). (1998). The struggle for accountability: The World Bank,
NGOs and grassroots movements. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Fox, J., & Gershman, J. (2000). The World Bank and social capital: Lessons from ten
rural development projects in the Philippines and Mexico. Policy Sciences, 33,
399–419. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vj8v86j.
Francis, P. (2001). Participatory development at the World Bank: The primacy of
process. In B. Cooke & U. Kothari (Eds.), Participation: The new tyranny?
(pp 72–87). London: Zed.
Fung, A., & Wright, E. O. (Eds.). (2003). Deepening democracy: Institutional
innovations on empowered participatory governance. London: Verso.Fung, A., Graham, M., & Weil, D. (2007). Full disclosure. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Galbraith, J. K. (1952). American capitalism: The concept of countervailing power.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
García Sánchez, A. (2017). Territorialidades en disputa. COCOMACIA, ‘‘posconflicto”
y resistencias en el Medio Atrato, Colombia, Manaus: Universidade Federal do
Amazonas – UFAM, Museu Amazônico, Programa de Pós-Graduação em
Antropologia Social, Ph.D thesis.
Garrison, J., & Aparicio, T. (N.d.). The challenges of promoting participatory
development in the Amazon. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, unpublished.
Gaventa, J. (1998). The scaling-up and Institutionalization of PRA: Lessons and
challenges in. In J. Blackburn & J. Holland (Eds.), Who changes?: Institutionalizing
participation in development (pp. 153–166). London: Intermediate Technology.
Gaventa, J. (2006). Finding the spaces for change: A Power Analysis. IDS Bulletin, 37,
23–33.
Gaventa, J., & Barrett, G. (2012). Mapping outcomes of citizen engagement. World
Development, 40(12), 2399–2410.
Gerring, J. (2017). Case study research: Principles and practices (2nd edition.).
Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Gibson, C., & Woolcock, M. (2008). Empowerment, deliberative development, and
local-level politics in Indonesia: Participatory projects as a source of
countervailing power. Studies in Comparative International Development, 43(2),
151–180.
Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J. (Eds.). (2004). Rethinking social movements: Structure,
meaning and emotion. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Gracia Hincapié, L. (2013). Las organizaciones locales en contextos de desarrollo: el
caso de los consejos comunitarios del tramo construido de la carretera Las
Ánimas-Nuquí (Chocó), Ciencia Política 15, January-June, 136-153.
Green, D. (2016). How change happens. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Griffiths, T. (2000). World Bank projects and indigenous peoples in Ecuador and
Bolivia. Presented at the ‘‘Workshop on Indigenous Peoples, Forests and the
World Bank: Policies and Practice.” Washington, D.C.: Forest Peoples
Programme, Bank Information Center.
Grajales, J. (2015). Land grabbing, legal contention and institutional change in
Colombia. Journal of Peasant Studies, 42(3–4), 541–560.
Grueso, L., Rosero, C., & Escobar, A. (1998). The process of black community
organizing in the Southern Pacific Coast region of Colombia”. In S. E. Alvarez, E.
Dagnino, & A. Escobar (Eds.), Cultures of politics/politics of cultures: Re-visioning
Latin American social movements (pp. 196–219). Boulder: Westview.
Guatemal, M. (2006). La situación del movimiento indígena en Ecuador, in
Gutiérrez, R. & Escárcega, F., (eds.) Movimiento indígena en América Latina:
Resistencia y proyecto alternativo, Vol. II, La Paz, Bolivia/Mexico City: Casa Juan
Pablos, Centro de Estudios Andinos y Mesoamericanos, Universidad Autónoma
de Puebla, pp. 197–213.
Guerrero Lovera, C., Herrera Arango, J., Helo Molina, E., Beltrán Ruíz, A., Aramburo
Vivas, A., Zapata, S., et al. (2017). Derechos territoriales en las comunidades
negras: Conceptualización y sistema de información sobre la vulnerabilidad de los
territorios sin titulación colectiva. Bogotá, Colombia: El Observatorio de
Territorios Étnicos y Campesinos/Universidad Javieriana.
Hale, C. (2002). Does multiculturalism menace? Governance, cultural rights and the
politics of Identity in Guatemala. Journal of Latin American Studies, 34, 485–524.
Hale, C. (2011). Resistencia para que? Territory, autonomy and neoliberal
entanglements in the ‘‘empty spaces” of Central America. Economy and
Society, 40(2), 184–210.
Herington, M., & van der Fliert, E. (2018). Positive deviance in theory and practice: A
conceptual review. Deviant Behavior, 39(5), 664–678.
Hernández-Díaz, J., & Martínez, V. L. J. (2007). Dilemas de la institución municipal:
Una incursión en la experiencia oaxaqueña. Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa/UABJO.
Hickey, S., & Mohan, G. (Eds.). (2004). Participation: From tyranny to transformation.
London: Zed Books.
Hickey, S., & Mohan, G. (2005). Relocating participation within a radical politics of
development. Development and Change, 36(2), 237–262.
Hickey, S., & Mitlin, D. (2009). Rights-based approaches to development: Exploring the
potential and pitfalls. Sterling VA: Kumarian.
Hoffmann, O. (2000). ‘‘Titling collective lands of the black communities in
Colombia, between innovation and tradition” in Assies W., Hoekema, A. & van
der Haar, G. (Eds.) The challenge of diversity: indigenous peoples and reform of
the State in Latin America. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis. 123–136.
Holland, J., Brockelsby, M. A., & Abugre, C. (2004). Beyond the technical fix?
Participation in donor approaches to rights-based development. In S. Hickey &
G. Mohan (Eds.), Participation: From tyranny to transformation (pp. 252–268).
London: Zed Books.
Hossain, N., Khurana, N., Mohmand, S., Nazneen, S., Oosterom, M., Roberts, T., et al.
(2018). What does closing civic space mean for development? A literature
review and proposed conceptual framework. IDS Working Paper No 515.
Houtzager, P., & Moore, M. (Eds.). (2003). Changing paths: International development
and the new politics of inclusion. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
ICCI (2001). Banco Mundial y PRODEPINE: ¿Hacia un neoliberalismo étnico?’,
Boletin del Instituto Cientifico de Culturas Indígenas. No. 25, 2-8.
IDMC (2007). Resisting displacement by combatants and developers: Humanitarian
Zones in north-west Colombia. Geneva: International Displacement Monitoring
Centre/Norwegian Refugee Council.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2013). Case of the Afro-descendant
Communities displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v.
Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of
November 20, 2013. Series C No. 270, San José, Costa Rica: CIDH.
J. Fox /World Development 132 (2020) 104978 17Joshi, A., & Moore, M. (2000). Enabling environments: Do anti-poverty programmes
mobilize the poor? Journal of Development Studies, 37(1), 25–56.
Joshi, A. (Ed.) (2019). Accountability amidst fragility and violence: Learning from
recent cases, IDS Bulletin, 50(3), https://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/index.php/idsbo/
article/view/3046/Online%20article.
Keck, M. (1998). Planafloro in Rondônia: The limits of leverage”. In J. Fox & L. D.
Brown (Eds.), The struggle for accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and grassroots
movements (pp. 181–218). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in
international politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Kumar, S., & Corbridge, S. (2002). Programmed to fail? Development projects and
the politics of participation. Journal of Development Studies, 39(2), 73–103.
Laurie, N., Andolina, R., & Radcliffe, S. (2005). Ethnodevelopment: Social
movements, creating experts and professionalising indigenous knowledge in
Ecuador. Antipode, 37(3), 470–496.
Larrea, F., Cobo, A., García, M., & Hernández, K. (2002). Las capacidades de las
organizaciones indígenas y afroecuatorianas de segundo y tercer grado: Resultados
del censo de entidades ejecutoras de PRODEPINE e índice de fortalecimiento
institucional. Informe de consultoría para PRODEPINE. Quito: Fundación Heifer
Ecuador (unpublished).
Larrea Maldonado, F. (2010). Estado neoliberal y movimiento indígena:
Neoindigenismo, biopolítica y representación, Masters’ tesis. Quito: FLACSO.
Li, T. M. (2007). The will to improve: Governmentality, development and the practice of
politics. Durham: Duke University Press.
Li, T. M. (2008). Focal—European Social reproduction, situated politics, and The Will
to Improve. Journal of Anthropology, 52, 111–118...
Lucero, J. A. (2008). Struggles of voice: The politics of indigenous representation in the
Andes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Mansuri, G., & Rao, V. (2013). Localizing development: Does participation work?
Washington, DC: World Policy Research Report-development-does-
participation-work.
Martínez Valle, L. (2003). Endogenus peasant responses to structural adjustment. In
L. L. North & J. D. Cameron (Eds.), Rural progress, rural decay: Neoliberal
adjustment policies and local initiatives (pp. 85–105). Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian.
Martínez Novo, C. (2013). The backlash against indigenous rights in Ecuador’s citizens’
revolution. In T. Eisenstadt, M. Danielson, M. Bailón Corres, & C. Sorroza Polo
(Eds.), Latin America’s multicultural movements. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martínez Novo, C. (2014). Managing diversity in postneoliberal Ecuador. Journal of
Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology, 19(1), 103–125.
Martínez, V. L. J. (2013). What we need are new customs: Multiculturality,
autonomy and citizenship in Mexico and the lessons of Oaxaca. In T. Eisenstadt,
M. Danielson, M. Bailón Corres, & C. Sorroza Polo (Eds.), Latin America’s
multicultural movements. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martínez Valle, L (2006). Las organizaciones de segundo grado como nuevas formas
de organización de la población rural. In H. C. de Grammont (Ed.), La
construcción de la democracia en el campo latinoamericana (pp. 107–132).
CLACSO: Buenos Aires.
McGee, R., & Pettit, J. (Eds.). (2019). Power, empowerment and social change. London:
Routledge.
Meyer, D., & Minkoff, D. (2004). Conceptualizing political opportunity. Social Forces,
82(4), 1457–1492.
Mijelski, K. J., & Beck, S. H. (2011). Pachakutik and the rise and decline of the
Ecuadorian indigenous movement. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
Miller-Adams, M. (1999). The World Bank: New agendas in a changing world. London:
Routledge.
Millikan, B. H. (2001). O Painel de Inspeção do Banco Mundial e o pedido de
investigação sobre o PLANAFORO. In F. Barros (Ed.), Banco Mundial, participação,
transparência e responsabilização: A experiência brasileira com o Painel de Inspeção
(pp. 79–122). Brasilia: Rede Brasil sobre Instituções Financeiras Multilaterais.
Nadelman, R., Le, H., & Sa, A. (2019). How does the World Bank build citizen
engagement commitments into project design? Results from pilot assessments
in Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan, IDS Working Paper, No. 525,
April, Brighton, U.K.: Institute of Development Studies/Accountability Research
Center. https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14449.
Narayan, D. (1995). The contribution of people’s participation: evidence from 121
rural water supply projects. Environmentally Sustainable Development
Occasional Paper Series; No. 1. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Narayan, D. (2005). Measuring empowerment: Cross-disciplinary perspectives.
Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Nelson, N., & Wright, S. (Eds.). (1995). Power and participatory development: Theory
and practice. London: Intermediate Technology Publication.
Ng’weno, B. (2000). On titling collective property, participation, and natural resources
management: Implementing indigenous and Afro-Colombian demands.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Ng’weno, B. (2007). Turf wars: Territory and citizenship in the contemporary state.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Nieto Cabrera, C. (2004). El acceso legal a la tierra y el desarrollo de las comunidades
indígenas y afroecuatorianas: La experiencia del PRODEPINE en el Ecuador
(p. 2004). Quito: FAO.
North, L.L., Kit, W.A. and Koep, R.B. (2003). Rural land conflicts and human rights
violations in Ecuador, in North, L.L. and Cameron, J.D., Rural progress, rural decay:
Neoliberal adjustment policies and local initiatives, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian, pp.
106–123.
O’Connor, J. (1973). The fiscal crisis of the state. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Olken, B. (2007). Monitoring corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in
Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), 200–249.Olken, B. (2008). Direct democracy and local public goods: Evidence from a field
experiment in Indonesia, NBER Working Paper, No. 14123, June.
Oslender, U. (2007). Violence in development: The logic of forced displacement on
Colombia’s Pacific Coast. Development in Practice, 17(6), 752–764.
Oslender, U. (2016). The Geographies of Social Movements: Afro-Colombian
Mobilization and the Aquatic Space. Durham: Duke University Press.
Ostrom, E. (1996). Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and
development. World Development, 24(6), 1073–1087.
Pacari, N. (1996). Ecuador taking on the neoliberal agenda. NACLA Report on the
Americas, 29(5), 23–32.
Pallares, A. (2002). From peasant struggles to Indian resistance: The Ecuadorian Andes
in the late twentieth century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Pardo, M. (2002). Entre la autonomía y la institucionalización: Dilema del
movimiento negro colombiano. Journal of Latin American Anthropology, 7(2),
60–85.
Paschel, T. (2010). The right to difference: Explaining Colombia’s shift from color
blindness to the Law of Black Communities. American Journal of Sociology, 116
(3), 729–769.
Peña, X., Vélez, M. A., Cárdenas, J. C., Perdomo, N., & Matajira, C. (2017). Collective
property leads to household investments: Lessons from land titling in Afro-
Colombian communities. World Development, 97, 27–48.
Peiffer, C., & Armytage, R. (2019). Searching for success: A mixed methods approach
to identifying and examining positive outliers in development outcomes.World
Development, 121, 97–107.
Peixoto, T. (2012). Participatory budgeting: Seven defining characteristics.
DemocracySpot.
PNPM (2012). The PNPM rural impact evaluation, summary series. Jakarta:
Kementrian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat, Kementarian PPN
Bappenas.
Pollock, I., & Kendrick, A. (2015). 15 years of Indonesia’s national community-driven
development programs. Jakarta: World Bank – PNPM Support Facility.
Portfolio Management Task Force (1992). Effective implementation: Key to
development impact (Wapenhans Report). Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Redwood, J. (2002). World Bank approaches to the Brazilian Amazon: The bumpy road
toward sustainable development Sustainable Development Working Paper 13.
World Bank, Latin America and Caribbean Region.
República de Colombia (2015). Títulos colectivos a comunidades negras adjudicados
entre las vigencias 1996 y 2015. Bogotá: Ministerio de Agricultura, Instituto
Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural – INCODER.
Rich, B. (2013). Foreclosing the future: The World Bank and the politics of
environmental destruction. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Rodrigues, M. G. M. (2004). Global environmentalism and local politics. Albany: SUNY
Press.
Salim, A., Bulan, W. R., Untung, B., Laksono, I., & Brock, K. (2017). Indonesia’s Village
Law: Enabler or constraint for more accountable governance? Making All Voices
Count Research Report. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
Sánchez Gutiérrez, E., & Roldán Ortega, R. (2002). Titulación de los territorios
comunales afrocolombianos e indígenas en la costa Pacífica de Colombia.
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (1992). Fondos Municipales de Solidaridad: Guía
técnica. Mexico: Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional.
Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto (1992). Modificaciones y adiciones a la
normatividad para la operación de los Fondos Municipales de Solidaridad que
deberán observarse y hacerse cumplir para el ejercicio 1992. Dirección General de
Integración Sectorial Proyecto de Descentralización y Desarrollo Regional
Mexico-Banco Mundial, January.
Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in movement. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Treakle, K. (1998). Ecuador: Structural adjustment and indigenous and
environmental resistance. In Fox, J. & Brown. L.D. (Eds.) The struggle for
accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and grassroots movements, Cambridge: MIT
Press, pp. 219–264.
Udall, L. (1998). The World Bank and public accountability: Has anything changed?
In J. Fox & L. D. Brown (Eds.), The struggle for accountability: The World Bank,
NGOs and grassroots movements (pp. 391–436). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Uquillas, J., & Van Nieuwkoop, M. (2003). Social capital as a factor in indigenous
peoples development in Ecuador, Sustainable Development Working Paper, No.
15, World Bank, Latin America and Caribbean Region.
Tilly, C. (1998). Where do rights come from? In T. Skocpol (Ed.), Democracy,
revolution and history (pp. 55–72). Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press.
Van Nieuwkoop, M. & Uquillas, J. (2000). Defining ethnodevelopment in operational
terms: Lessons from the Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples
Development Project, Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6, World
Bank, Latin American and Caribbean Region.
Velásquez, M. C. (2000). El nombramiento. Oaxaca: Instituto Electoral.
Velásquez, M. C. (2004). Migrant communities, gender and political power in
Oaxaca. In J. Fox & G. Rivera-Salgado (Eds.), Indigenous Mexican migrants in the
United States (pp. 483–494). La Jolla: Center for US-Mexican Studies.
Vélez, M. A. (2011). Collective titling and the process of institution building: The
new common property regime in the Colombian Pacific. Human Ecology, 39(2),
117–129.
Vélez, M. A., Robalino, J., Cárdenas, J. C., Paz, A., & Pacay, E. (2019). Is collective titling
enough to protect forests? Evidence from Afro-descendant communities in the
Colombian Pacific region Serie Documentos Cede, 2019–03. Bogotá: Universidad
de los Andes.
VeneKlasen, L. & Miller, V. (2002). A new weave of power, people & politics: The action
guide for advocacy and citizen participation, Oklahoma City: World Neighbors.
18 J. Fox /World Development 132 (2020) 104978Voss, J. (2008). Impact evaluation of the second phase of the Kecamatan development
program in Indonesia. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Wade, P. (2012). Afrocolombian social movements. In K. Dixon & J. Burdick (Eds.),
Comparative perspectives on Afro-Latin America (pp. 135–154). Gainesville:
University of Florida.
Watson, G. (1992). Water and Sanitation in Sa¯o Paulo, Brazil: Successful Strategies
for Service Provision in Low-income Communities. Thesis (M.C.P.)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning.
Weaver, C. (2008). Hypocrisy trap: The World Bank and the poverty of reform.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wong, S. (2003). Indonesia Kecamatan Development Program: building a
monitoring and evaluation system for a large-scale community driven
development program. Discussion paper. Washington, DC: World Bank:
Environment and Social Development Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region.
Wong, S., & Guggenheim, S. (2005). Community-driven development:
Decentralization’s accountability challenge in World Bank East Asia
decentralizes: Making local government work. Washington DC.: World Bank.
Woodhouse, A. (2005). Village corruption in Indonesia: Fighting corruption in the
World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program Indonesia social development
paper; no. 6. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
World Bank (1993). Colombia – Natural Resource Management Program Project.
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
World Bank (1994a). The World Bank and participation. Washington, DC: The World
Bank, Operations Policy Dept.
World Bank. (1994b). An overview of monitoring and evaluation at the World Bank,
No. 13247, Washington DC: The World Bank, Operations Evaluation Dept.
World Bank (2001a). Participation process review. Washington, D.C.: The World
Bank, Operations Evaluation Department (unpublished).
World Bank. (2001b). Implementation completion report: Colombia Natural
Resource Management Program, Report No. 23418, Washington, DC: The
World Bank.World Bank (2003). World development report 2004: Making services work for poor
people. Washington, DC: World Bank/Oxford University Press.
World Bank. (2003b). Implementation completion report: Ecuador - Indigenous and
Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project. Report No. 25361, Washington,
DC: World Bank.
World Bank (2004a). Ecuador – Second Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples
Development Project. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
World Bank. (2004b). Implementation completion report: Rondônia Natural
Resources Management Project, No. 11671, Washington, DC: The World Bank,
Operations Evaluation Department.
World Bank (2006). Note on cancelled operation (IBRD-72350) on a loan in the amount
of US$ 34 million to the Republic of Ecuador for a Second Indigenous and Afro-
Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
World Bank (2010). Safeguards and sustainability policies in a changing world: An
Independent Evaluation of World Bank Group experience. Washington, DC: The
World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group.
World Bank (2014a). Learning and results in World Bank operations: How the Bank
learns Evaluation 1. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Independent Evaluation
Group.
World Bank (2014b). Strategic framework for mainstreaming citizen engagement in
World Bank Group operations: Engaging with citizens for improved results.
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
World Bank (2016). Behind the mirror: A report on the self-evaluation systems of the
World Bank Group. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Independent Evaluation
Group.
World Bank (2018). Engaging citizens for better development results: An independent
evaluation. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group.
Zambrano Murillo, M. G. (2011). La resignificación de la justicia social en el Valle de
Chota. Quito, Ecuador: Ediciones Abya Yala/FLACSO.
